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Assumption of Risk in Products Liability
Cases*
Robert E. Keeton**
Resourceful advocacy has caused an expansion of the doctrine of assumption of risk, under both that name and the alias,
volenti non fit injuria,' well beyond the central idea of voluntary submission to a fully appreciated risk. The counterattack
has not focused upon such dubious extensions alone; rather, it
has been urged that all elements of the doctrine worth salvage
are independently recognized under other rubrics of the law, and
that either the doctrine should be banned from further use or
else a statement that the plaintiff assumed the risk should be
regarded as no more than a converse expression of the conclusion that the defendant is not liable. Four other areas of law
are particularly relevant to this controversy -that area of contract law concerned with exculpatory agreements and those areas
of tort law concerned with contributory negligence of the plaintiff, want of duty of the defendant, and want of the required
causal relation between the defendant's sub-standard conduct
2
and the plaintiff's harm.
The existence of at least a wide area of overlapping of assumption of risk and other theories of defense3 is beyond chal*The research assistance of Chester Dean Dusseault and Edward F. Sherman,
Harvard Class of 1962, is gratefully acknowledged.
**Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Some courts have insisted that the doctrine of assumption of risk is applicable only in employment cases, or perhaps also in other cases of contractual
relations, and that the corresponding doctrine in cases outside these groups is
volenti non fit injuria. It is generally conceded, however, that this is a difference
in terminology only, the requisites and consequences of the two doctrines in their
respective spheres being the same. See, e.g., Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc.,
150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951) ; Jay v. Walla Walla College, 53 Wash.2d
590, 335 P.2d 458 (1959).
2. The doctrines in these four areas of law do not, however, exhaust the possibilities for basing a result of nonliability on some other theory though it might
have been found that there was an assumption of risk in the sense of voluntary
submission to a fully appreciated risk. Another possibility is breach of plaintiff's
duty of mitigation, a theory closely analogous to contributory negligence. See
note 61 infra.
3. For convenience, the term "defense" is here used in the broad sense of a
basis for denial of relief, including not only those grounds as to which the defendant has a burden of pleading or proof but also those that are a negation of part
of plaintiff's prima facie case. Thus, the term "defense" encompasses theories of
no duty and no legal cause.
[122]
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lenge. The principal question to which this article is addressed
is whether there are, nevertheless, in accident cases generally
and products liability cases particularly, some circumstances in
which it is appropriate to recognize a defense of assumption of
risk that is distinct in character from other defensive theories,
including exculpation by contract, contributory negligence, want
of duty, and want of legal cause.
I.

MEANINGS OF "ASSUMPTION OF RISK"

"Assumption of risk," like "no duty," is a phrase of art. Perhaps it is adequate for the purpose when used candidly to signify
only the conclusion of nonliability. More often, however, it is
used as if it were an expression of reasons for this conclusion.
It is true that, to one who is familiar with opinions in which the
phrase has appeared, its use may call to his mind the cases he
knows and perhaps even the reasons underlying the patterns of
decisions. The phrase is nevertheless inadequate for signifying
grounds of decision because of uncertainty about its meaning.
"Assumption of risk" suggests that the conclusion of nonliability is based on consent to risk, whereas some of the senses in
which the phrase is used are in sharp contrast with this connotation. Usage includes shadings in meaning from one to the
other of two extremes with respect to dependence on consensual
elements. These differences in consensual elements are concerned primarily with the degree of similarity between that
aspect of the situation to which one has consented and that
aspect as to which he is barred from recovery under the conclusion of assumption of risk. It will be useful to identify the extremes (the first and sixth meanings below), to identify other
important meanings among the range of possibilities falling between these extremes, and to assign some terminology for use
in this article as short-hand references to the several meanings
4
identified.
4. This assertion of the utility of identifying important meanings of "assumption of risk" as it has been used by judges and other legal writers is basically at
odds with Dean Green's assertions, first, that the term "assumption of risk" and

such associated terms as "consent," "voluntary," "knowledge" and "appreciation"
are "inconstant and unstable, meaningful only in the light of the factual and
environmental context of the particular case, and can only frustrate judgment if
given or attempted to be given a stable or static content of meaning" and, second,
that this state of affairs "insures the freedom of a court to reach a just or at
least an acceptable result in a particular case" and is therefore a good thing.
Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, supra p. 78. It is true that "assumption of
risk" has been used in many different senses, that it has been used often without
precision, and that study of the context is often essential to understanding the

sense of usage. But it is not true that all writers have been guilty of such im-
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(1) Express assumption of risk. This is a defense based on
an agreement between two persons, subsequently occupying the
roles of plaintiff and defendant, that the plaintiff shall have no
legal relief against the defendant for harm to person or property, within the scope of the agreement, caused by defendant's
risk-creating conduct or by a condition that the defendant creates or omits to change. From defendant's point of view, this
arrangement is one of exculpation and disclaimer of responsibility; from plaintiff's point of view, it is a consent to exculpation and an assumption of responsibility.
(2) Subjectively consensual assumption of risk. This is a
defense based on a plaintiff's state of mind of uncoerced willingness to encounter a fully appreciated risk - that is, a willingness, with full understanding of the risk to himself or his property, caused by defendant's act or omission, to remain or have
his property remain within the area of risk. This is consent to
risk, not consent to exculpation, and it is subjective in the sense
that it is based on a plaintiff's state of mind rather than his
objective manifestations. Assumption of risk is used in this
sense in the Restatement of Torts."
A basic enigma inherent in this, as well as the next usage
discussed below, is its dependence upon the notion of full appreciation of risk. "Risk" implies a degree of want of appreciation
of the forces that are at work in a given factual setting, since if
one knew and understood all these forces he would know that injury was certain to occur or that it was certain not to occur.
Thus the expression "fully appreciated risk" may seem to be a
self-contradiction.
The answer to this enigma may be approached through the
recognition that "risk" is not a physically descriptive term but
rather an abstraction constructed by the mind of man. Risk
must always be defined from some human point of view, and
precision all of the time, and hopefully it is not futile to work for greater clarity
in the formulation and expression of reasons for decision and thus to encourage
evenhandedness in the administration of justice, though at the expense of some
"freedom of a court to reach a just or at least an acceptable result" by yielding

to pressures or unexplained hunches. Courts remain free to reach just results
on reasoned bases, even though overruling outmoded precedents in the process.
5. The meaning of "uncoerced" in this context is discussed under "The Duress
of Defendant's Wrong," p. 154 infra.
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 893 (1934). "The rule stated in this section differs
from that stated in § 892 (Consent) in that the existence of the defense is dependent upon the plaintiff's state of mind."

Id.

Comment a.
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any such view is one of incomplete understanding of the physical
facts upon which the abstraction, risk, is constructed.
The nature of any risk is dependent upon the choice of the
point of view from which it is defined since that choice determines the character and degree of knowledge and understanding
of the facts that are assumed in the definition. For example;
from the separate points of view of two persons watching an
automobile approach an obstruction at high speed, the risks are
different if only one knows that the automobile has defective
brakes. Thus, saying that one "fully appreciated a risk" makes
sense oply in relative terms; it is a way of saying that his understanding of the probability of harm was at least as good as would
be achieved from some point of view chosen as a standard for
judgment.
The risk referred to in "assumption of risk" is a risk that N
causes defendant's conduct to be characterized as infringing a
legal standard. Where the basis of liability is negligence, that
risk is determined from the point of view of the ordinarily prudent person in the position of the defendant at some one or more
times prior to the occurrence of the harm. Thus, saying that
plaintiff had the full appreciation of risk required for subjectively consensual assumption of risk is in most circumstances the
same as saying that he in fact understood that risk to himself
and his property as well as the defendant should have under7
stood it.
A subsidiary question is whether "risk" is unitary or separ7. Perhaps the understanding that defendant should have had cannot always
be used as the standard, however. First, in relation to exceptional circumstances
in which defendant's appreciation was in fact greater than could have been expected of him and one aspect of his negligence was failure to act upon that special
knowledge, probably "full appreciation of risk" implies that plaintiff's understanding of the risk was as good as defendant's. Secondly, though I disagree in
part with comments in Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, supra

p. 17 et seq., Professor Mansfield persuades me of the need for some modification
of the standard in relation to cases in which defendant's negligence occurred at
a point of time in advance of plaintiff's choice. If the risk as it would have
appeared to the reasonable man in defendant's position has been modified by
events intervening !between defendant's negligent conduct and plaintiff's choice,
it would seem that the defense of assumption of risk should not be defeated by
the plaintiff's want of understanding of some aspect of that original risk that
has disappeared before the occurrence of his choice; such an aspect of the origi-

nal risk is not within the risk from which plaintiff suffered and on which
plaintiff's claim is founded. But if plaintiff has suffered from a risk that was
created by defendant and was not understood by plaintiff, the latter ought not to
be barred by his informed choice to encounter some other risk unless making the

choice is contributory negligence. I agree with Professor Mansfield that this line
of thought is related to causation.
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able for this purpose. That is, in seeking to determine whether
there is subjectively consensual assumption of risk, should *we
ask whether plaintiff fully understood the risk that caused de-

fendant to be subject to liability, or instead whether he fully
understood a risk, the particular one that materialized in harm,
among a group that, together, caused defendant to be subject to
liability? If plaintiff, renting a car from defendant, fully understood the danger from defendant's carelessly maintained tires but
did not know of defendant's carelessly maintained brakes, is the
concept of subjective consent to risk applicable to harm caused
by the defect of the tires without contribution by the brakes, but
inapplicable to harm of which the defect of the brakes was a
cause? Probably the correct answer is the affirmative. It is a
commonly accepted proposition that, even though plaintiff is
barred by assumption of risk from recovering for harms caused
by risks to which he consented, he is not barred from recovering
for harms from other causes.8 Separability of risk is implicit in

this proposition.
Since proof of plaintiff's full appreciation of a risk is proof
that plaintiff understood that risk as well as defendant should
have understood it and since, by hypothesis, defendant was neg8. Though holdings squarely in point are scarce, the following opinions are
illustrative of many that support this proposition: Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Olvera, 119 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1941) (failure to
give defendant's requested instruction on assumption of risk by trapeze artist
was not error since it failed to include a qualification to the effect that she was
barred only "if her injuries were caused by such danger and peril" as she understood when she chose to engage in the work; plaintiff's judgment was set aside,
however on the separate ground that, in view of a provision of the performance
contract excusing the defendant from liability for ordinary negligence, the court
erred in refusing to charge that plaintiff must prove gross negligence to recover) ;
Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So.2d 49, 61 A.L.R.2d 1254 (La. App. 1956) (fisherman's companion assumed all ordinary hazards incident to the venture, but not
the risk of fisherman's negligent casting of fly so that it struck the companion's
eye; as authority for the present point 'both this opinion and others it cites are
weak because they may be read as defining the risks assumed in a sense that is
not dependent on plaintiff's consent to risk); Goldstein v. United Amusement
Corp., 86 N.H. 402, 169 Atl. 587 (1933) (plaintiff who knew that stairs were
wet but not that risers were of unequal height did not assume risks from latter
condition), subsequently explained in Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d
377 (1941), as a case that could have been decided on the basis that in New
Hampshire, at least in cases not involving a master-servant relationship, voluntary
exposure to a known danger is not a bar unless it amounts to contributory negligence; Triangle Motors of Dallas v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W.2d 60
(1953) (plaintiff undoubtedly knew there was danger in close approach to an
open elevator shaft near which he was working, but, in view of his testimony
that he thought he was on the top floor, it might be inferred that he did not
consent to accept the risk of being hit by an elevator descending without warning
signals; trial court erred in withdrawing the case from the jury and entering
judgment for defendant).
Also see the discussion of "ordinary" and "extraordinary" risks in Annot., Liability for injury to or death of participant in game
or contest, 7 A.L.R.2d 704, 707-11 (1949).
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ligent, one may ask whether such proof does not also establish
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The answer depends
in part on the fact that the defendant's conduct is judged on the
basis of all the substantial, foreseeable risks his conduct creates,
to plaintiff and to others, whereas plaintiff's understanding
that is relevant to assumption of risk is concerned with only the
risks to himself and his own property. Moreover, the utility of
plaintiff's conduct that subjects himself to risks will usually
be different from the utility of defendant's conduct that causes
the same risks. Thus the comparison between the utility and
risk on which the finding of negligence is dependent will not be
the same as to plaintiff and defendant. It may happen that the
plaintiff is reasonable in choosing to encounter a fully appreciated risk even though the defendant is unreasonable in causing it. 9
(3) Objectively consensual assumption of risk. This is a defense based on a plaintiff's objective manifestations of uncoerced
willingness to encounter a fully appreciated risk, even though his
uncommunicated state of mind may be one of lack of full appreciation of the risk or lack of willingness to encounter it. This is
objectively manifested consent to risk. This defense differs from
express assumption of risk in that the manifestations of the
plaintiff do not go so far as to express willingness to accept legal
responsibility for harm to himself and thus to grant exculpation to the defendant. This form of the doctrine, along with each
of the other forms besides the first, is often called implied assumption of risk. The result of exculpation, however, is not an
implication in fact of plaintiff's manifestations; rather, it is a
conclusion imposed by law. The objectively consensual form of
implied assumption of risk makes that legal conclusion dependent upon plaintiff's having manifested a voluntary and informed
choice of consent to the risk.
Ordinarily there is little argument for the proposition that
the legal consequences of the two forms of consensual assumption of risk - subjective and objective - should be different.
The practical significance of such a distinction is further reduced by the likelihood that judges and juries would, on given
evidence, find the facts requisite either to both of these forms of
assumption of risk or to neither. It will be useful to have a sin9. Cf. Page
108 et seq.

Keeton,

A8sumption of

Risk

and

the Landowner, supra

p.
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gle phrase that is understood to include both the subjective and
objective senses, and in this article the unqualified expression
"consent to risk" will be used for this purpose. That is, it will
be said that a person "consents to a risk" if either he has the
state of mind of willingness to encounter the fully understood
risk or his manifestations indicate that he has that state of mind.
(4) Assumption of risk by consent to conduct or condition.
This is a defense based on objective manifestations of uncoerced
willingness that defendant engage in a particular act or omission
or course of conduct, or that he create or omit to change a physical condition, to which the risk is incident. This is consent to
conduct or condition. There may be manifestation of such consent without manifestation of the full appreciation of risk that
is a requisite of consent to risk.
The proposition, often asserted, that a plaintiff in a given
type of case assumes risks that are obvious rests on either this
or one of the less consensual senses of assumption of risk (the
most common of which are discussed in the next two paragraphs
below), since by its terms this proposition applies regardless of
whether in the particular case there is evidence to support either
a finding that plaintiff did in fact fully appreciate the risks or
a finding that his objective manifestations so indicated. Perhaps the meaning of the phrase in this proposition is best described as "assumption of risk by consent to conduct or condition involving a risk that is obvious." Thus, this usage is described in terms of the fourth of the meanings identified here,
but with an added qualification (the italicized phrase) giving
rise to a high probability that the consensual element is stronger
than in other usages that fall in this fourth category.
(5) Associational assumption of risk. This is a defense
based on objective manifestations of consent to an associationto
which the risk is incident. There may be manifestations of consent to an association without manifestations of full appreciation
of the risk and without manifestations of consent to particular
aspects of the association or to conduct in pursuance of it.
(6) Imposed assumption of risk. This is a defense recognized regardless of willingness or unwillingness of the plaintiff
to encounter a risk, regardless of his appreciation or lack of appreciation of it, and regardless of his manifestations of consent
or nonconsent to conduct or condition or to an association with
the defendant.
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When "assumption of risk" is used in the extreme form of
the imposed sense, the phrase is strictly an expression of the
legal conclusion of no cause of action; any connotation that consent or voluntary participation is a reason for that legal conclusion is false and misleading. The connotation of reasons for that
conclusion must be derived from known patterns of decisions
rather than from the phrase used to describe the defense. This
legal conclusion of no cause of action might also be expressed
by saying that the defendant had no duty to the plaintiff under
the circumstances of the case, or that he committed no breach
of duty.
A conclusion of no breach of duty may rest on either (1) the
basis that the conduct was not unreasonable and that there is no
liability without negligence, or (2) the basis that even though
the conduct may have been unreasonable, the defendant had no
duty of care toward the plaintiff. Assumption of risk is more
often used in the latter type of case, but occasionally also in the
former, as in the statement that the traveler on the public highway assumes the risk of unintended harms caused to him by the
non-negligent driving of others.
When "assumption of risk" is used in the associational sense,
the consensual connotation may be quite misleading, but it could
be thought to have at least a diluted counterpart in reality since
the defense is based on the voluntary character of the association. Indeed, the voluntary character of the association of the
plaintiff with the defendant is said to be the gist of this form of
the defense. 10 Yet, the effect of its application is that the plaintiff, by voluntarily entering into an association, assumes those
risks that, by rules of law, are imposed upon a voluntary participant in such an association. The obvious circularity of the
statement of this meaning of assumption of risk reflects the
inescapable fact that it is but another way of expressing the legal
conclusion that responsibility for the risk in question shall be
imposed upon one who voluntarily enters into the association in
question. This legal conclusion may be and often has been
reached without dependence upon a finding of manifestations
of appreciation of the risk and uncoerced willingness to encounter it, and without dependence upon a finding of manifestations
of uncoerced willingness that defendant engage in a course of
conduct or maintain a condition. Consent to the association, not
10. See 2 HARPER

AND JAMES, TORTS

1165, 1173 (1956).
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consent to the risk or consent to the conduct or condition, is the
gist of the defense. The similarity of this concept to the pure
extreme of imposed assumption of risk is apparent since every
physical injury arises from some kind of association and every
association is in some degree voluntary. Doubtless the phrase
appears in this extreme sense of imposed assumption of risk in
the statement that each traveler on the public highway assumes
the risk of unintended harms caused to him by the non-negligent
driving of others. How different is it to say that when one voluntarily enters into an association with other travelers by going
upon the highway he assumes these risks? Or to say, with somewhat greater candor, that in these circumstances he is held to
assume these risks? Perhaps the distinction is that the concept
of association implies a relationship among a limited number of
persons - fewer, for example, than the whole group of travelers
upon the highway. As the group is enlarged, the consensual element of the relationship is diminished; in such a very large
group as the travelers upon the highway, it reaches insignificance. Thus, it is hardly an accurate factual description of plaintiff's state of mind or his objective manifestations concerning
his state of mind to say that when he voluntarily becomes a traveler on the highway he is voluntarily entering into an association
with each person whom he might encounter.
The recognition of these six categories of assumption of risk
and the use of the terminology suggested here are not representative of the rationale or language of judicial opinions.
Rather this analysis is an attempt to identify meanings that are
implicit in various judicial applications of assumption of risk.
The distinctions among these six meanings of assumption of risk
are distinctions in degree of consensual elements, progressing
from one extreme of express assumption of risk to the other
extreme of imposed assumption of risk. Different systems of
classification of meanings of assumption of risk have been suggested by others, and it will be well to note some of them.
Harper and James refer to three meanings as express assumption of risk, assumption of risk in its primary sense and
assumption of risk in its secondary sense.1 ' "Express assumption of risk" is used by them in the same sense as it is used in
this article. For them, "in its primary sense the plaintiff's assumption of a risk is only the counterpart of the defendant's lack
11. 2 id. at 1162, 1184-85.
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of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk. '12 They observe
that "the voluntary character of the association is the gist of the
defense."'1 3 The primary sense in their terminology appears to
be the sense referred to in this article as associational assumption of risk. In further explanation of their terminology, they
add:
"A plaintiff may also be said to assume a risk created by
defendant's breach of duty towards him, when he deliberately
chooses to encounter that risk. In such a case, except possibly in master and servant cases, plaintiff will be barred
from recovery only if he was unreasonable in encountering
the risk under the circumstances. This is a form of contributory negligence. Hereafter we shall call this "assumption
of risk in a secondary sense.' 14 (Emphasis added.)
The italicized passage is very misleading. Note that Harper and
James are referring only to cases in which plaintiff is said to
''assume a risk created by defendant's breach of duty towards
him." Their theory is that the mass of decisions holding that
plaintiff is barred because of his deliberate choice to encounter
a risk created by defendant's conduct are outside the group of
cases referred to in this passage because they are in truth cases
in which defendant had no duty towards plaintiff and was therefore not guilty of a breach of duty. Only if one disregards what
many courts have said to be their grounds of decision in assumption of risk cases and accepts this no-duty reinterpretation can
he agree with the italicized passage.,
In contrast with Harper and James, Prosser refers to a different meaning of assumption of risk as its primary sense, and
identifies four different senses, as follows:
"In its simplest and primary sense, it means that the plaintiff has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of
an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chance
of injury from a known risk. The result is that the defend12. 2 id. at 1162.
13. 2 id. at 1165, 1173.
14. 2 id. at 1162.
15. Further comments on the choice between classifying assumption of risk
as a phase of no duty and classifying it as a distinct, affirmative defense appear
infra, text at notes 91-98. Note that the views expressed in this article are consistent, however, with Harper and James' position that, because of the nature
of the underlying justifications for the defense of associational assumption of
risk (assumption of risk in the primary sense, by their terminology) that defense
is better expressed in terms of lack of duty to the plaintiff.
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ant is simply under no legal duty to protect the plaintiff. A
second, and closely related meaning, is that the plaintiff, with
knowledge of the risk, has entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which necessarily involves it, and
so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to take his own
chances....
"In a third type of situation the plaintiff, aware of a risk
created by the negligence of the defendant, proceeds voluntarily to encounter it - as where, for example, a workman
who finds that a machine has become dangerous and that his
employer has failed to repair it, continues to work at the machine. He may not be negligent in doing so, since his decision
may be an entirely reasonable one, and he may even act with
unusual caution because he knows the danger; but the same
policy of the common law which finds expression, as to intentional torts, in the doctrine that no wrong is done to one who
consents will bar him from recovery where damage results
from a risk which he has accepted and brought upon himself.
"To be distinguished from these three situations is the
fourth, in which the plaintiff's conduct in encountering a
known risk is itself unreasonable, and amounts to contributory negligence."' 16
Prosser's "primary sense" is closely comparable to the first
of the six meanings identified above - express assumption of
risk; his second, to associational assumption of risk. His third
sense is somewhat like one or the other of the two forms of consensual assumption of risk. The above passage might be thought
to refer to subjectively consensual assumption of risk, but there
are other indications that the sense to which Prosser refers is
more nearly like that identified in this article as objectively consensual assumption of risk, though his usage goes somewhat beyond objectively manifested consent to risk since it includes
cases in which the plaintiff is charged with knowledge though he
does not have it and has not manifested that he has it. 1 7
A usage of "assumption of risk" to refer to a kind of contributory negligence (Prosser's fourth sense and Harper and
16. PRossEB, TORTS 303-04 (2d ed. 1955).
17. E.g., in discussing "Knowledge of Risk," he states that "it is evident that
in all such cases an objective standard must be applied, and that the plaintiff
cannot be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been

obvious to him." Id. at 310.
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James' second) cannot be placed at any point within a pattern
of meanings classified with respect to the degree of consensual
elements. Rather, assumption of risk in any of the six senses
identified in this article will sometimes overlap contributory
negligence; the grounds for application of both defenses may be
present in a single set of facts.
The choice among various methods of expression is a matter
of significance if it influences the effectiveness of communication. The use of "assumption of risk" to refer to a kind of contributory negligence serves only the cause of confusion, since
the relationship between the two doctrines and the policy justifications underlying them is one of overlapping; neither doctrine can be said to be only a phase of the other.
A cogent criticism of the use of "assumption of risk" in the
imposed sense is its misleading character because of its consensual connotation. This criticism is applicable also, though in
less serious degree, to use of the phrase in the associational and
the consent-to-conduct-or-condition senses. At the least, these
usages result in throwing together under one term defenses that
are essentially different. If such usages of the phrase "assumption of risk" are prevalent, it is often necessary to use qualifying
adjectives such as "associational" or "imposed" in order to communicate effectively. At worst, such usages lead to indiscriminate treatment of different types of cases as if they were alike,
without inquiry as to whether reasons for recognition of a defense in one may be inapplicable in the other.
Some support can be found in case law for application of
each of the six forms of the defense of assumption of risk that
have been identified. Policy justifications based on consensual
elements grow weaker as these elements diminish in the progression from the first to the sixth. It is therefore important to determine in which of the several senses "assumption of risk" is
being used when it is being applied or its application is being
urged in a case under study.

II.
A.

PRECEDENTS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES

Disclaimers of Responsibility

In general, though with exceptions that will be discussed
presently,' an agreement exonerating one of the parties or lim18. Text at notes 30-41 infra.
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iting his liability to the other is effective between themselves. 1'9

But, in the absence of a relationship under which one of the two
has the power to bind a third person, the parties to a contract

cannot make an effective declaration that one or both of them
0
2
shall not be liable to a third person.

The cry of want of privity, which in pre-MacPherson21 days

was a remarkably effective part of the defendant's arsenal of
argument in products liability cases, is almost silenced. Today
the ingenuity of counsel for suppliers of products is more often

directed to the drafting of disclaimers of responsibility and to
the development of extensions of privity that will enlarge the
group of persons who are bound by the disclaimers.
The favored technique of manufacturers and middlemen for
enlarging the group against whom disclaimers may be effective
is to cause a disclaimer in favor of themselves to be made a part
of the transaction between the retailer and retail purchaser. If

the product is of an appropriate type for requiring the execution
of a retail sales agreement, the disclaimer appears in that agree19. E.g., Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (sale of new
car with defective gasoline tank construction) ; Rasmus v. A.O. Smith Corp., 158
F.Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958) (sale of corn bin unfit for particular purpose) ;
Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 129 F.Supp. 335
(N.D. Iowa 1955) (sale of electrical equipment with defects that caused damage
to the equipment); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 116 F.Supp.
122 (S.D. W.Va. 1953) (sale of bottles for use in marketing carbonated beverage); Charles Lachman Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 79 F.Supp. 206 (E.D.
Pa. 1948) (sale of chemical for use in making carpet sizing) ; Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (sale of insecticide for crop
dusting) ; Weik v. Ace Rents, Inc., 249 Iowa 510, 87 N.W.2d 314 (1958) (rental
of power lawn mower with broken safety device); Ortolano v. U-Dryvit Auto
Rental Co., 296 Mass. 439, 6 N.E.2d 346 (1937)
(rental of car with defective
brakes) ; Miller v. Klindworth, 98 N.W.2d 109 (N.D. 1959) (sale of mislabeled
seed wheat) ; Moss v. Fortune, 340 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. 1960) (rental of horse
and saddle with defective stirrup); Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis.
398, 63 N.W.2d 720 (1954) (sale of used car with defective brakes; the opinion
comments both that the court could find no breach of duty by the defendant since
the plaintiff bought the car "as is" and that in so buying plaintiff assumed the
risk) ; Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 404, 410 (1956) (motor vehicle bailment). Cf. Carpenter v. Josey Oil Co., 26 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1928). And see Bashford v. Slater,
250 Iowa 857, 865, 96 N.W.2d 904, 909 (1959) (agreement signed by a person
participating in stock car racing as a flagman; not a products liability case);
Hall v. Sinclair Refining Co., 242 N.C. 707, 89 S.E.2d 396 (1955) (exculpatory
agreement between "owner-operator" of service station and the defendant company,
which installed underground tank and pumping equipment that allegedly leaked).
20. E.g., see Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720
(1954), sustaining the defense that a used car with defective brakes was sold to
the plaintiff "as is" and distinguishing Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis.
196, 218 N.W. 855, 60 A.L.R. 357 (1928), as a case involving liability of the
seller to a third party with whom the buyer collided because of defective brakes.
Also see Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890, 896 (10th Cir. 1960), which, however, involved an oil drilling contract rather than products liability.
2. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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ment. Also, cautionary directions and a notice of disclaimer may
be printed on the retail package where that is practical,2 2 in the
hope that they will be effective not only against the purchaser
and others in privity, as an alleged part of the contractual transaction, but also against consumers generally as a notice placing
them on guard and setting the basis for arguments of implied
assumption of risk and no breach of duty.
The forms of disclaimers are quite varied. Some are sweeping exculpations from all responsibility. 23 Perhaps the same
scope is commonly intended by that form of disclaimer involved
in an agreement that the product is sold "as is. '"24 More common,
however, are the disclaimers that are expressed as qualifications
of a written warranty that is declared to be given in lieu of all
other warranties, express or implied. 25 Whenever this more subtle form of disclaimer is used, the likelihood of the purchaser's
being misled is greatly increased, and courts have freely invoked
rules of construction disfavoring the conclusion that a clause
expressed an agreement of exculpation of the supplier from
2
liability for its own otherwise tortious conduct. 6
22. Such disclaimers may protect the retailer and middlemen as well as the
manufacturer. See Taylor v. Jacobson, 336 Mass. 709, 715, 147 N.E.2d 770, 774
(1958), wherein the court remarks that the retail vendor of a product sold by
trade name "adopts as his own any cautionary statements, disclaimers and limitations of warranties made (on the package and in accompanying circulars) by the
manufacturer who best knows the infirmities of his product." But this is not so
if the retailer sells the product "by description" rather than by trade name. Sokoloski v. Splann, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942) (sale of seed by oral description as "good field corn").
23. E.g., Weik. v. Ace Rents, Inc., 249 Iowa 510, 87 N.W.2d 314 (1958)
Ortolano v. U-Dryvit Auto Rental Co., 296 Mass. 439, 6 N.E.2d 346 (1937). In
Moss v. Fortune, 340 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. 1960), the plaintiff, at the time of rental
of a horse and saddle from defendant, signed a form stating, "I am hiring your
horse to ride today and all future rides at my own risk." The court sustained this
agreement as a bar to a claim based on negligence in supplying a defective stirrup.
Might this cryptic agreement have been held inapplicable to a risk caused by negligence in supplying defective equipment in view of its failure to specify such risks
and the possibility of its being understood by the rider to refer to risks arising
from the nature of the horse rather than the equipment?
See also Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960), involving an
oil drilling contract with a sweeping exculpatory clause.
24. E.g., see Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720
(1954). U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (a) declares that "all implied warranties are excluded
by expressions like 'as is' . . . ."
25. E.g., Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958)
(held enforceable); Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (held
enforceable); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1.960) (held unenforceable); Norway v. Root, 361 P.2d 162 (Wash. 1961)
(standard warranty held enforceable in suit against automobile dealer alone on
the express warranty only, the court expressly reserving questions concerning its
validity and effect on implied warranties).
26. E.g., see Gray Line Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 280 F.2d 294 (9th
Cir. 1960) (tire rental contract containing clause by which the bus line agreed
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Occasionally the terminology of assumption of risk has been
used with reference to disclaimers.2 7 At other times, however,
opinions have not adverted to the relation between the effective28
ness of disclaimers and the doctrine of assumption of risk.
In practice, manufacturers often choose not to stand on their
disclaimers but instead to use them as means of attaining dis-

cretion to honor or reject claims selectively, without accountability for their standards of selection; moreover, even in cases of
litigated claims, manufacturers sometimes decline to urge their
29
disclaimers.
The impact of disclaimers is also affected by doctrinal developments concerning their enforceability. In the first place,
agreements purporting to relieve one of the parties from responsibility to the other for wilful or gross misconduct are generally
to indemnify the tire supplier construed as not effective to defeat a claim of the

bus line based on negligent installation of an improper type of tire) ; Doughnut
Mach. Corp. v. Bibbey, 65 F.2d 634 (1st Cir. 1933) (exculpatory agreement not
sufficiently explicit to amount to an assumption of "liability" for personal injuries
caused when the negligently defective automatic doughnut machine splashed hot
grease in the face of a lessee of the machine) ; Sproul v. Cuddy, 131 Cal. App. 2d
85, 280 P.2d 158 (2d Dist. 1955) (exculpatory clause in agreement for rental of
"invalid walker" held inapplicable to bailor's negligence in view of statement in
the clause that bailor "uses great care to have all its equipment in good order
and repair") ; Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 271 P.2d 122 (2d Dist. 1954,
hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct., Traynor, J., dissenting) (exculpatory declarations
in oil tool supplier's catalog and invoices construed not to relieve supplier of consequences of its own negligence, as distinguished from breach of warranty) ; Pan
American World Airways v. United Aircraft Corp., 163 A.2d 582 (Del. 1960)
(disclaimer construed to bar action for breach of warranty but not action for
negligence of supplier of defective aircraft parts) ; Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191
Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) (adopting construction that warranty of
truck "applies exclusively to the replacement of a defective part" and has no
hearing on actions for damages based on breach of implied warranty of merchantability and fitness). Also see Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.
1960) (contention that the exculpatory clause of an oil drilling contract protected others, as well as the promisee, was unsuccessful) ; Gottsdanker v. Cutter
Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr 320 (1st Dist. 1960, hearing denied by Cal. Sup, Ct.)
(disclaimer as to efficacy of poliomyelitis vaccine construed to apply to claims of
failure to protect against the disease and not to claims of breach of implied warranty of merchantability in that the vaccine itself caused the disease) ; Burr v.
Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (disclaimer construed
as negating implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose but not implied
warranty of merchantable quality).
27. E.g., Moss v. Fortune, 340 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. 1960). Also see Tyler v.
Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1960), referring to an exculpatory
clause in an oil drilling contract as an agreement of the contractor to assume the
risk of loss or damage to his equipment.
28. E.g., Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Hall v. Everett
Motors, Inc., 165 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; Norway v. Root, 361 P.2d 162 (Wash.
1961). See also Doughnut Mach. Corp. v. Bibbey, 65 F.2d 634 (1st Cir. 1933),
referring to assumption of "liability" rather than risk.
29. See GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILTY IN TiE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 191-93
(1960).
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unenforceable.30 Secondly, agreements purporting to relieve one
party from responsibility to the other for negligence or even less
blameworthy conduct of the former are unenforceable in some
situations. Restrictions on the power of common carriers and
employers to disclaim or limit responsibility are well developed. 3 '
The principal basis for declaring clauses of this type to be
against public policy has been the overwhelming bargaining ad32
vantage of the party who obtained the exculpatory agreement.
The doctrine of unenforceability of unconscionable exculpatory
agreements has been extended by a number of opinions to situations involving public service corporations and bailees for hire,
33
and by a few opinions to transactions of banks and lessors.
There is some support for extending the doctrine to advertising
misrepresentations.3 4 Recently it has been extended in a scattering of cases to a miscellaneous assortment of other kinds of
situations. One such case involved the contract of a company
providing specialized services in the oil industry.33 Another involved a contract between a caterer and a bride and groom. 3 6 A

third, of more direct significance for the area of products liability, is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,37 an action for
injuries sustained by the buyer's wife upon failure of the steering mechanism of a new car when it was, according to the odometer reading, in the 469th mile of travel. Sustaining a cause of
action based on implied warranty, the court held unenforceable
the exculpatory provisions of the uniform warranty of the Auto30. E.g., Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1945).
31. E.g., The Ansaldo San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U.S. 494
(1935) (common carrier) ; Jewell v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., 231 Mo. 176,
132 S.W. 703 (1910) (employer) ; Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388
(1906) (express company as employer) ; 2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 575
(1932). In the absence of applicable legislation, however, some decisions have upheld such agreements between employer and employee. E.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
32. Of. Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 16 (1948).
33. See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948).
34. See Ebers v. General Chemical Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945)
(manufacturer of compound intended for use in controlling peach tree borer and
negligently placed on market without proper field tests to ascertain whether it
would damage trees "cannot escape responsibility for such negligence merely by
adding a disclaimer of warranty to its representation of safety").
35. Mohawk Drilling Co. v. McCullough Tool Co., 271 F.2d 627 (10th Cir.
1959).
36. Rosenthal v. 285 Buffalo Ave. Corp., 189 F.Supp. 677 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
The caterer, sued by a wedding guest, filed a third party complaint against the
bride and groom who had signed an agreement that the caterer would not be
liable to any guest for injury and that the bride and groom assumed responsibility
for notifying guests. The third party complaint was dismissed on the dual grounds
that there was no agreement to indemnify and that the requirement for notification was so unreasonable as to be unenforceable.
37. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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mobile Manufacturers Association."8 Other courts, while enforcing the exculpatory provisions of this automobile form in particular cases, have deliberately cast doubt on their vitality.3 9 One
of these opinions reserves the question whether such exculpatory
clauses may be held unconscionable under provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 a section of which declares that a "limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."' 41 Increasing recognition of the doctrine of unenforceability of exculpatory agreements appears to be in prospect, particularly in relation to personal injuries caused by defects in products sold under
contracts of adhesion such as are commonly used in mass marketing.
B.

Other Forms of Assumption of Risk in Products Liability
Cases

Relatively few opinions in products liability cases, aside from
those involving disclaimers, have discussed assumption of risk
in any of its various forms. 42 In still fewer instances has a judgment for defendant rested on this theory or any concept that
might be regarded as one of its variants. In one recent case in
38. Id. at 73-74, 161 A.2d at 84-96. Cf. General Motors Corp v. Dodson, 338
S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960, cert. denied by Tenn. Sup. Ct.), allowing an action
for damages, on the theory of breach of warranty, without discussion of the limitations of the standard automobile warranty clause, though it was quoted in the
opinion.
39. Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 165 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 1960) (reserving the
question whether such provisions may be unenforceable under the UCC) ; Norway
v. Root, 361 P.2d 162 (Wash. 1961) (enforcing such provisions in a suit against
the automobile dealer alone on the express warranty only, no claim having been
made on the theory of implied warranty).
40. 1all v. Everett Motors, Inc., 165 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 1960).
41. UCC § 2-719(3).
42. This conclusion is confirmed by others. See FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY 349 (1960); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 594, 615 (1961) ; Annot., 78
A.L.R.2d 460, 491 (1961) ; Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 76 (1961). There is, of course,
a twilight zone in which it is difficult to classify a case as within or outside the
area of products liability. Cases involving a claim of liability because of defendant's supplying, for use by workers, an instrumentality inappropriate for a particular use, as distinguished from his marketing a defective product, are not generally regarded as products liability cases, and no attempt has been made to collect
such cases, though a few are cited herein. See note 55 infra, and see Cummins v.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 319 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (inadequate "stabbing board" on oil derrick; plaintiff barred as a matter of law because of his knowledge of danger of its breaking) ; Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Murphy,
271 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (negligent loading of logs by defendant
on truck furnished by plaintiff; plaintiff barred as a matter of law from recovery
for injuries from log falling on him at unloading point since, after protesting at
the time of loading, he nevertheless accepted the load with complete knowledge
of the danger).
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which a jury verdict for the defendant was sustained against a
contention that the trial court erred in submitting assumption of
risk to the jury, it appears that approval of this theory of de-

fense was essential to the result reached. 43 In another recent
case, a directed verdict for the defendant was sustained solely
on the ground of assumption of risk.44 In other cases a holding
that the plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law was one
of two grounds of decision for the defendant, the other being

either contributory negligence as a matter of law 45 or no breach
of duty to the plaintiff. 46 Occasionally where the plaintiff has
prevailed on a jury verdict, a court has indicated that assumption of risk was properly treated as a fact issue;47 this suggests.
43. Gallegos v. Nash, San Francisco, 137 Cal. App.2d 14, 289 P.2d 835 (1st
Dist. 1955). Cf. the following, which, though not strictly products liability cases,
are closely analogous: Warren v. Sullivan, 10 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1st Dist. 1961, hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct.) no error in instructions on assumption of risk of defective brakes by guest passenger in car; verdict and judgment for defendant) ;
Lyle v. Disneyland, 2 Cal. Rptr. 704 (4th Dist. 1960) (no error in instructions on
assumption of risk of "Astro-Jet" ride by minor in amusement park; verdict and
judgment for defendant).
44. Runnels v. Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System Jackson Co., 220 Miss. 678,
71 So.2d 453, 46 A.L.R.2d 397 (1954) (rented car that shimmied).).
45. Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (4th Dist. 1960,
hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct. with two justices dissenting) ; Sanders v. Kalamazoo Tank and Silo Co., 205 Mich. 339, 171 N.W. 523 (1919).
46. Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941) (rabies
vaccine administered, with fatal consequences, to one who had seen a pamphlet
that warned of risk) ; Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1955) (incomplete
repair of brakes, with notice to plaintiff that they were still defective) ; Lombard
Water-Wheel Governor Co. v. Great Northern Paper Co., 101 Me. 114, 63 Atl. 555
(1906) (attempt by defendant's representative to adjust governor for water wheel
of plaintiff's mill, with mutual understanding that attempted use of governor was
experimental). Compare Saddlemire v. Coca-Cola Co. of Canada, [1941] 4 D.L.R.
614. The plaintiff continued to drink after noticing a bad odor and taste; later
he observed that there was a mouse in the bottle. One ground of decision seems
to have been a rejection of the argument that the manufacturer owed a duty to
the ultimate consumer of a packaged product, the rejection being based on the
fact that the liquid and glass container did not conceal the mouse from observation. But should not the manufacturer's duty extend also to cases of a partially
concealed defect, at least where the plaintiff has not discovered the defect? Of,
course the claim would be subject to a defense of contributory negligence, if
proved. Another ground of decision was that plaintiff was barred by his voluntary
choice to incur the risk incident to drinking of the contents after noticing the bad'
odor and taste. But was the risk fully appreciated by the plaintiff? It is rare.
that, on the facts, it can fairly be said that the plaintiff acquires full appreciation
of risk through odor and taste. Cf. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND TREFOOD CONSUMER 76-80 (1951) (discussing the defense of contributory negligence
in food cases) ; Annot., 77 A.L..R.2d 215, 240 (3.961) (beverage cases) ; Annot.,.
77 A.L.R.2d 7, 54-55 (1961) (food cases).
47. De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Kelly
v. Pittsfield Coal Gas Co., 257 Mass. 441, 154 N.E. 74 (1926) ; Baldridge v.
Wright Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 452, 96 N.E.2d 300 (1961). Cf. Robbins v. MilnerEnterprises, Inc., 278 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1960) (summary judgment for defendant overturned since record did not establish that there would be no jury issue on
knowledge of risk that defective brakes would lock). See also McClanahan v. Cali-fornia Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953), in which the-
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the possibility that a few more cases are won by defendants on
this theory at the trial level. Finally, in some cases wherein
there is no reference to assumption of risk as such, the basis of
decision is that the plaintiff had knowledge of a defective condition and is therefore in no position to recover for injuries it
caused.48 These several indications of success of defendants in
urging some theory that might possibly be regarded as one of
the variants of assumption of risk add up, to a rather unimpressive total in comparison with the volume of products liability
cases.
Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co.,49 one of the few cases
resting judgment at least alternatively on assumption of risk,
will serve as a useful illustration. The plaintiff sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident allegedly due to a defectively designed "damper" that had no adequate device to lock the ,damper
knob; as a result it would unwind and permit wobbling of the
front wheel at high speeds. The plaintiff, an experienced motorcyclist, discovered the defect several days and several hundred
miles before the accident, but continued his pleasure trip "without the slightest compulsion of business or otherwise." 50 Overturning a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the district court of appeals held that as a matter of law the plaintiff was barred on
the two grounds of assumption of risk, with actual knowledge
of the danger, and contributory negligence; the Supreme Court
denied hearing, two justices dissenting.5'
In Saeter, and perhaps in most other products liability cases
in which the defense of assumption of risk has been sustained,
court's discussion of assumption of risk adverted to the fact that this issue had
been submitted to the jury, which found for the plaintiff, but the court directed
its attention primarily to answering the defendant's argument of no duty and then
turned to the defense of assumption of risk, remarking: "Once the question of the
duty to warn has been determined, this question [assumption of risk] is simplified,
if not settled."
48. In addition to cases cited infra note 66, which rely on a no-duty theory,
see, e.g., Youtz v. Thompson Tire Co., 46 Cal.App.2d 672, 116 P.2d 636 (1941)
(hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct. with Carter, J., dissenting) (injury while mounting defective tire) ; Gutelius v. General Electric Co., 37 Cal.App.2d 455, 99 P.2d
682 (1940) (hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct. with Carter, J., dissenting) (injury
while operating washing machine wringer with defective shifter lever). These two
California cases are discussed in FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABMITY
349-50 (1960). The theory of these opinions appears to be a combination of the
ideas that the manufacturer's duty was limited to warning and that its negligence
was not a proximate cause of the injury. See also Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 28-36,
71-72 (1961), and note 69 infra.
49. 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (4th Dist. 1960, hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct. with two
justices dissenting).
50. Id. at 753.
51. Ibid.
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it appears that the form of the concept of which the court was

thinking was consent to risk, either subjective, or objectively
manifested. 52 Ordinarily products liability opinions using the
phrase "assumption of risk" in one of the less consensual senses
have done so only in the process of declaring the defense unavailable. 53 Thus, it has been said that on grounds of public policy it

is better to impose an implied warranty on the sale of food than
statement
"to compel the purchaser to assume the risk" 54 -a
using the phrase in the sense of imposed assumption of risk, not
at all concerned with the more consensual forms of the doctrine.
A number of decisions have held the defense of assumption
of risk inapplicable in the absence of proof that the plaintiff
fully appreciated the risks incident to use of a product.5 5 Occa52. In Saeter, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 752, the court remarked that knowledge of the
danger "must he actual." Most of the other opinions cited in notes 43-46 supra also
speak of knowledge of danger in a way that is consistent with the concept of
consent to risk, though they do not explicitly reject less consensual forms of assumption of risk. But see comments on Carmen and Gallegos in the next note
infra.
53. See, e.g., cases cited in note 54 infra. But see Carmen v. Eli Lilly Co.,
109 Ind. App. 76, 84, 32 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1941), wherein the court said that the
decedent whose death was caused by rabies vaccine administered after he had seen
a pamphlet describing the risk "is presumed to have acquainted himself with not
only a part, but all of the pamphlet." Also observe the slight deviation from the
principle of consent to risk in cases recognizing a defense of assumption of obvious
risks without any requirement of findings as to either the plaintiff's state of mind
or his manifestations. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Nash, San Francisco, 137 Cal.App.2d
14, 289 P.2d 835 (1955) (dictum that "the plaintiff cannot be heard to say that
he did not comprehend a risk that must have been obvious to him"). Also see
text at note 58 infra.
54. Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 99, 49 N.E. 210, 211 (1897) ; Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co. v. Schneider, 249 Ky. 261, 264, 60 S.W.2d 594, 595 (1933)
Cf. Finck v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 136 F.2d 191, 192 (6th Cir. 1943)
(dictum that for injury from unwholesome food the vendor is liable "and there is
no assumption of risk by the purchaser"), quoted in Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 215, 240
(1961.); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Eiseman, 259 Ky. 103, 108, 81
S.W.2d 900, 902 (1935) (vendor of food is strictly liable for unwholesomeness
and the purchaser "does not assume the risk"), cited in Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 7,
55 (1961). But cf. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Travis, 192 Ala. 453, 455, 68
So. 342, 343 (1915) (dictum that dining car patron must be presumed to know
the general risk from the commonly known capacity of oysters for rapid deterioration, but a verdict for the patron was sustained on a theory of negligence of the
defendant "in the last selection of the particular oysters").
55. Robbins v. Milner Enterprises, Inc., 278 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1960) (automobile brakes) ; Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.
1958) (automobile steering mechanism) ; Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin
Co., 224 F.2d 120, 124-26 (6th Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1955)
(aircraft wing splice) (see, however, note 58 infra) ; Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, 919 (1948) cert. denied, 68 S.Ct. 1816 (1948)
(storage tank for liquefied gas), citing RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 893 (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1938) (in relation to negligent conduct of defendant) and id. § 523 (in
relation to ultrahazardous activities of defendant) ; Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 163 Cal.App.2d 410, 415, 329 P.2d 575, 579 (1958, hearing denied by Cal.
Sup. Ct.) (braking system for boom of crane) ; Milestone System, Inc. v. Gasior,
160 Md. 131, 152 Ati. 810 (1931) (door of rented car) ; McCormick v. Lowe &
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sionally the opinions in such cases have added that it did not

appear that the plaintiff should have appreciated the risk.56 It
is probably inappropriate, however, to infer from such an opinion that the court would have held the defense to be established
by proof that the plaintiff should have appreciated the risk, even
though he did not. Such proof goes far toward establishing con-

tributory negligence, though not all the way since there might be
countervailing justifications that stand in the way of a finding
that plaintiff's conduct was unreasonably risky. Also, proof that
plaintiff should have appreciated the risk helps to support a fact

finding that he did in fact appreciate it. But in general there
is support, in the few products liability cases that are relevant,
for the proposition that assumption of risk is not established
57
without a fact-finding of consent to risk.
Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 235 Mo. App. 612, 626, 144 S.W.2d 866, 872 (1940)
(vaulting pole). Cf. Arnold v. May Department Stores Co., 337 Mo. 727, 737,
85 S.W.2d 748, 754 (1935) (hair dye). See also the following cases, which might
be regarded as not within the products liability classification: Fletcher v. Kemp,
327 S.W.2d 178, 186 (Mo. 1959) (defendant placed in the hands of plaintiff, for
welding, a drum containing residue of explosive liquid; "assumption of risk applies
only where there is knowledge and appreciation of the danger") ; Reed v. Rosenthal, 129 Ore. 203, 276 Pac. 684 (1929) (an illustrative case among a number
involving patrons of beauty parlors) ; Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex.
191, 201, 238 S.W.2d 172, 178 (1951) (the plaintiff was injured while inspecting
the defendant's work in the welding of a pipeline).
56. McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 235 Mo. App. 612,
626, 144 S.W.2d 866, 872 (1940) (plaintiff "did not, prior to the accident, know
or have cause to believe the pole was not a safe one to use in vaulting") ; Reed
v. Rosenthal, 129 Ore. 203, 276 Pac. 684 (1929) ("testimony does not indicate
that plaintiff had any reason to, or did, appreciate any risk or danger in obtaining
the facial") ; Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 201, 238 S.W.2d
172, 178 (1951)
("it cannot be said that [the plaintiff] had either actual or
implied knowledge of the specific defect").
Cf. Robbins v. Milner Enterprises,
Inc., 278 F.2d 492, 495 (5th Cir. 1960) (statement that question whether proof
of knowledge that brakes were grabbing established knowledge also of risk of their
locking so as to wrest car from control calls for application of rule of ordinary
prudence). See also Valmas Drug Co. v. Smoots, 269 Fed. 356, 360 (6th Cir.
1920) ("plaintiff did not assume the risk from [use of eyewash] unless she knew
and appreciated the danger therefrom, or should have done so").
57. See Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, 919 (1948)
Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 747, 752 (4th Dist. 1960, hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct. with two justices dissenting) (knowledge of the danger
"must be actual") ; Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal.App.2d 410, 415,
329 P.2d 575, 579 (1958, hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct.) (there must be "actual,
not constructive knowledge of the risk") ; Arnold v. May Department Stores Co.,
337 Mo. 727, 737, 85 S.W.2d 748, 754 (1.935) ; Baldridge v. Wright Gas Co., 154
Ohio St. 452, 96 N.E.2d 300 (1951) ("knowledge of danger and intelligent acquiescence therein"). But cf. Valmas Drug Co. v. Smoots, 269 Fed. 356, 360 (6th Cir.
1920) (no assumption of risk unless plaintiff appreciated danger "or should have
done so") ; Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Travis, 192 Ala. 453, 455, 68 So. 342,
343 (1915) (dictum that dining car patron must be presumed to know the general
risk from the commonly known capacity of oysters for rapid deterioration; but a
vedict for the patron was sustained on a theory of negligence of the defendant
"in the last selection of the particular oysters") ; Carmen v. Eli Lilly Co., 109
Ind. App. 76, 84, 32 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1941) (victim of rabies vaccine who bad
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It is true here, as elsewhere in the law of torts, that confusion has sometimes developed because of failure to distinguish
between the fact that must be proved and the method by which
it may be proved. This confusion is especially apparent in relation to objectively manifested consent to risk. The crucial fact,
under this form of the doctrine, is that the plaintiff has manifested that his state of mind is one of full appreciation of the
risk and willingness to encounter it. If he manifests such appreciation and willingness, the fact that he secretly knows that he
does not understand or is not willing to submit to the risk does
not save him from the defense. On the other hand, the fact that
the risk is one he should appreciate does not establish either contributory negligence (since it may happen that his encountering
the known risk is reasonable) or consent to risk (since it may
happen that he neither manifests nor secretly holds the state of
mind of full appreciation and willingness to encounter the risk).
Similarly, the fact that the risk is "obvious" falls short of establishing plaintiff's consent to risk, unless "obvious" means that
the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could make findings
that plaintiff neither manifested nor secretly held the state of
mind of full appreciation of the risk and consent to it. Probably
it is not a fair reading of opinions in point to interpret "obvious" this narrowly, 58 and one is thus forced to the conclusion
that in products liability cases, as in other areas, there is support
for a departure from the strict principle of consent to risk by
recognition of a defense of assumption of obvious risks without
any requirement of findings as to either the plaintiff's state of
mind or his manifestations.
Occasionally an opinion in a products liability case has
seemed to treat assumption of risk as merely a form of contributory negligence.5 9 More often, however, they have been recogseen pamphlet describing the risk "presumed to have acquainted himself with not
only a part, but all of the pamphlet").
58. E.g., see Gallegos v. Nash, San Francisco, 137 Cal.App.2d 14, 289 P.2d
835 (1st Dist. 1955), quoting PROSSER, TORTS 310 (2d ed. 1955) for the proposition "that the plaintiff cannot be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk
that must have been obvous to him." See also Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L.
Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 125 (6th Cir. 1955) wherein the majority opinion of
Judge Stewart states that the parties were agreed that in order to find assumption
of risk the jury must find that the plaintiff had knowledge of the risk and chose
to assume it "or that the danger was so obvious that Northwest must be taken
to have done so." The dissenting opinion of Judge McAllister, asserting that assumption of risk was properly submitted to the jury, relies on the theory that there
was evidence from which the jury might conclude that the dangers were "so open
and obvious to any competent engineer that they might be perceived at first
blush." Id. at 131.
59. E.g., see DeEugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 409, 413-14 (3d
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nized as distinct defenses. 60 Plainly assumption of risk overlaps
both contributory negligence and the analogue of contributory
negligence, breach of a duty of mitigation. 6'
It has been stated that to sustain the defense the defendant
must show not only that the plaintiff knew of the danger but
also that he voluntarily encountered it. 62 This line of thought is
suggestive of the qualification that the doctrine is inapplicable
in cases of consent to risk under the duress of defendant's
wrong. 3 There has also been intimation of a qualification that
the doctrine is inapplicable in some cases where the defendant's
wrong consists of a statutory violation.64
Cir. 1954). The court remarked that it was not surprising to find defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk appearing in the case since the
rolls of a hay baler, "the physical cause of plaintiff's injury, were not a hidden
danger but were obvious," and held that assumption of the risk and contributory
negligence were for the jury because plaintiff's voluntary exposure to a known
danger was not enough to bar him as a matter of law since "to have that effect
the voluntary exposure must be unreasonable." On the point stated in the last
quoted phrase, the court cited only RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 466, Comment c
(1934). The caption of that section is "Types of Contributory Negligence," and
Comment c concerns "Voluntary exposure to unreasonable risk." Comment d states
that there are two meanings of "voluntary assumption of risk," one of which is
that form of contributory negligence just described. The other meaning identified
in Comment d is a no-duty concept. The court does not refer to this other meaning, but perhaps it was partly with the purpose of negating applicability of this
latter concept of assumption of risk that the court observed that defendant's argument of no duty to warn of an obvious danger was defeated by the fact that plaintiff's risky conduct was just what he had seen defendant's demonstrators doing
in an attempt to make the defective baler operate. "The negligence was not in
failing to warn plaintiff to stay away but in demonstrating to him that it was
proper and safe to come near .... ." Id. at 413. Is this not a way of saying
that there was evidence from which it could be found that the danger was not
fully appreciated by the plaintiff? If so, the result, though not the opinion, is
easily reconciled with recognition that consensual assumption of risk is an independent defense, distinct from contributory negligence. Cf. FRuMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 351 (1960), suggesting that the court is "saying in

substance that, under the circumstances, the hazard was not necessarily so 'obvious' as to bar recovery, and that this presented [fact] issues both as to assumption of risk and contributory negligence."
Another opinion that appears to treat assumption of risk as a form of contributory negligence is Dalrymple v. Simkoe, 230 N.C. 453, 457, 53 S.E.2d 437, 440
(1949), quoting 46 AM. JUR. 931-32 (1943). Compare Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1957), wherein the opinion discusses the
two defenses together without adverting to any distinction.
60. E.g., Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (4th Dist.
1960, hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct. with two justices dissenting) ; Baldridge v.
Wright Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 452, 96 N.E.2d 300 (1951).
61. For a products liability case involving the duty of mitigation, see Hogan
Dairy Co. v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 358 P.2d 906 (Utah 1961) (verdict for
defendant upheld on evidence that plaintiff, lessee of milk processing equipment
manufactured by defendant, "knew of flavor and mechanical problems from the
time of installation" and unreasonably continued to use the equipment with mounting losses).
62. Wood v. Kane Boiler Wforks, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 201, 238 S.W.2d 172,
178 (1951).
63. See infra text at notes 79-87.
64. See Gallegos v. Nash, San Francisco, 137 Cal.App.2d 14, 289 P.2d 835
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A few opinions have indicated that the defense in question
is in essence one of no duty.6 5 This view implies that the supplier's duty is one of warning only as distinguished from a
broader duty of reasonable care to provide safety features for
the protection of even those who have notice of the danger. It is
therefore of interest that in some instances, with no mention of
assumption of risk, nonliability of suppliers has been rested on
the theory of no duty to take precautions beyond reasonable notice.6 6 The relationship between the duty of warning and assumption of risk is also reflected in one cosmetics case where
liability was imposed, the opinion observing that there was a
breach of the duty to warn and no assumption of risk.6 7 It is
also of interest that the result of nonliability of suppliers, where
adequate notice has been given, has been extended to claims on
the theory of breach of implied warranty68 as well as claims
based on negligence.
If the defendant's duty of care is only a duty to warn, nonliability is almost certainly the result that would follow, even
without reliance upon assumption of risk, in a case of injury to
one who voluntarily encountered the risk created by defendant
after learning, by other means, all that a proper warning would
have disclosed. Even without regard to other requirements of
legal cause, 69 this would be the result because it is most unlikely
(1955) (statute requiring testing of brakes; the court found no evidence of violation in this case, however).
65. E.g., Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 195-201, 205-06, 238
S.W.2d 172, 174-78, 180-81 (1951).
66. E.g., Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957) ; Taylor v. Jacobson, 336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d
770 (1958) ; Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). Cf. Annot.,
76 A.L.R.2d 9, 28-36 (1961). In Campo, the theory was that the supplier of an
onion-topping machine having no hand guard or emergency stopping device was
under no duty of care to a user since the dangers of use were patent. In Jamieson,
the majority opinion holds the manufacturer of an elastic exerciser not negligent
in failing to warn of the risk of injury if it should slip off the instep while being
used in a recommended exercise, because the danger was obvious; the dissenting
opinion, expressing the view that reasonable minds might differ as to whether
the risk from the recommended exercise was obvious, also adverted to the concept
of assumption of risk. In Taylor, it appeared that the plaintiff, in using a hair
dye, failed to follow directions that admittedly she had read, and the only part
of the opinion that might be regarded as referring to a concept of assumption of
risk is a passage observing that the retail vendor of a product sold by trade name
"adopts as his own any cautionary statements, disclaimers and limitations of
warranties made (on the package and in accompanying circulars) by the manufacturer who best knows the infirmities of his product." 336 Mass. at 715, 147
N.E.2d at 774.
67. Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1957).
68. Taylor v. Jacobson, 336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958).
69. With respect to that aspect of legal cause that is concerned with the conduct of third persons, see, e.g., Nishida v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 245
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that lack of warning by the manufacturer of a product would be
a substantial factor in bringing about injury to one having full
knowledge of the risk-creating characteristic of the product.7 0 In
these circumstances, regardless of whether it has significance in
any other way, the plaintiff's free and informed consent to risk
negates any prima facie case against the defendant by negating
causal connection between defendant's breach of duty to warn
and plaintiff's harm.
III.

POLICY BASES FOR ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Inquiry into reasons for recognition of assumption of risk

leads quickly into two twilight zones - that between consent to
a certainty of interference and assumption of a risk of interference and that between this pair of tort concepts and contract
concepts concerned with exculpatory agreements. A suitable
point of beginning for an inquiry into policy bases of assumption
of risk is a comparison of the concepts of consent to intentional
interference and exculpation by contract.
A.

The Relationship Between Consent in Intentional Torts and
Exculpation by Contract

If two persons, by their respective courses of conduct, manifest consent to mutual combat, each is denied a recovery from
the other by a number of decisions, though slightly a minority.71
F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Tayer v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 342 Mo. 912, 119
S.W.2d 240 (1938). Nishida sustains a verdict for defendant under instructions
permitting the jury to find that defendant's participation in development of a
soybean meal that poisoned plaintiff's cattle was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's loss in view of a letter, sent by defendant to the mill from which plaintiff
obtained the meal, warning against sale of the meal for cattle feed. In Tayer,
proof that plaintiff voluntarily encountered a known danger, under orders of his
employer, led to nonliability of a third person, who supplied allegedly defective
machinery, on the theory that, as a matter of law, defendant's conduct was not a
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, the court stating, "One without any right
of possession or control should not be required to search for and guard against
occurrences occasioned by acts of others which reasonably prudent persons would
not anticipate." 119 S.W.2d at 247. The opinion on motion for rehearing suggests the possibility of an action against the employer. Ibid. It is of interest that
liability of the employer and nonliability of the supplier might also have resulted
from application of a theory of consent to risk, this defense being available to
the supplier but unavailable to the employer either because of duress (see text
at notes 79-87) or because of abolition of the defense as between employer and
employee.
70. Cf. Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1957), quoting with approval from Dillard and Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use
and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145, 163 (1955). Also see the cases cited
in note 48 supra, and see FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 169, 172,
349-50 (1960) ; Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 71-72 (1961).
71. E.g., Lykins v. Hamrick, 144 Ky. 80, 137 S.W. 852 (1911); Galbraith
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Because of the apparent analogy to exculpatory contract, one
may be tempted to think of such a relationship as if there were
mutual promises of exculpation, but in most cases this would be
a distortion of the combatants' manifestations.
In consent cases other than those of mutual combat the
analogy to exculpatory agreements is ordinarily more remote,
though still observable. Nearly all such cases involve dealings
between the parties on the basis of which arguments of enforceability of an implied covenant not to sue can be built, if one is
willing to engage in fiction by inferring such a covenant from
the mere manifestation of consent to what would otherwise
amount to an intentional tort against his person or property, and
is willing to stretch concepts of consideration and reliance so as
to hold the covenant enforceable. These observations are illustrated in cases of consent to an operation or other medical procedure, cases of consent to sexual relations, and cases of consent
to entry upon realty for recreational purposes.
Should the legal result in a case of consent to interference be
different if the parties have entered into an exchange of express
covenants not to sue? An exculpatory agreement that is enforceable under contract law is a complete defense to any tort claim
within its scope. Such an agreement has been referred to as an
express assumption of risk where, as is ordinarily true, its scope
extends to risk and not merely to an interference certain to
occur. This usage seems to suggest that the basis for other forms
of assumption of risk is an analogy to exculpatory agreements.
But the analogy is inadequate as a policy justification since the
scope of application of other forms of assumption of risk is the
very area where enforceable agreement, the gist of express assumption of risk, is lacking. If other forms of assumption of
risk are to be sustained, and if the defense of consent is to be
sustained, other policy justifications than those underlying freedom of contract must be found. Conversely, if mutual covenants
of exculpation are proved, a rule that nevertheless imposes liability cannot be sustained unless policy justifications overriding
those concerned with freedom of contract can be found. Thus,
the policies underlying the principle of freedom of contract are
relevant, but not necessarily decisive.
v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 403, 27 N.W. 581

(1886); PROSSER, TORTS 87 (2d ed.
1955). This view was urged in Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for
Breaches of the Peace, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 819 (1924), reprinted in BouILEN,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 577 (1926), and was adopted in RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 60 (1934).
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For example, in a hypothetical case of mutual combat after
an exchange of express covenants not to sue, the legal responsibilities of the combatants to each other should not be determined
solely on the basis of the factors ordinarily brought to bear on
the problem of enforceability of a commercial bargain. The concern with public peace that has occupied the attention of some
courts in the tort cases on mutual combat is still relevant. It
seems likely, incidentally, that the result in many jurisdictions
would be the same in this hypothetical case as in a more typical
case of mutual combat without a prior exchange of express covenants not to sue. Just as some courts say that the consent is
ineffectual because it is consent to a breach of the public peace
(thus reaching the result that each combatant recovers against
the other),72 so they might say that the agreement composed of
express covenants not to sue is unenforceable because made pursuant to a plan for committing a breach of the public peace. Just
as some courts say that the criminal illegality of the breach of
the peace is no reason for denying the effectiveness of the consent in relation to a tort claim (thus reaching the result that
each bears his own loss),73 so they might say that the illegality
of an agreement to mutual combat is no reason for denying the
effectiveness of a mutual agreement not to invoke the aid of
courts in tort claims for injuries suffered. The decision to treat
the problem as one of contract would not resolve the near balance of competing arguments that have been brought to bear in
the mutual combat cases. But the interest in enforcement of
agreements would add some further weight to the arguments
for the minority rule of denying recovery in the mutual combat
cases, and perhaps would swing the other way the near balance
of decisions between allowance and disallowance of recovery.
In cases of consent to what would otherwise be an actionable
interference, without manifestation of a promise not to sue, the
policies underlying the general rule of enforceability of agreements are relevant by way of analogy, but inapplicability of
those policies is not decisive against the defense, since other interests are also at stake. Even where the dealings between the
parties go beyond consent and take the form of an exculpatory
agreement, other interests sometimes override those concerned
with enforceability of agreements and lead to a determination
72. E.g., McNeil v. Mullin, 70 Kan. 634, 79 Pac. 168 (1905) ; Roger v. Belcher,

100 W.Va. 694, 131 S.E. 556 (1926) ; PROSSER, TORTS 86-87 (2d ed. 1955).
73. See authorities cited in note 71 supra.
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that an agreement is unenforceable because contrary to public
policy. Conversely, where the transaction between the parties
falls short of an exculpatory agreement, other considerations
have nevertheless been found to favor a conclusion of nonliability because of consent. What is the nature of these considerations, and are they applicable to assumption of a risk of inter4
ference as well as consent to a certainty of interference ?
B.

The Relationships Among Fault, Consent, and Assumption
of Risk

Perhaps the most fundamental premise that remains almost
uniformly unchallenged in critical inquiries into bases of tort
doctrine is the proposition that, unless good reason can be found
for shifting a loss- unless more good than harm will be accomplished by doing so- the legal system ought to leave the
loss where it lies, denying every claim for relief that would
have the effect of shifting it. In modern Anglo-American law,
fault is the most generally acceptable justification for lossshifting by imposing liability in tort. The defenses of consent
(in relation to claims of intentional tort) and assumption of
risk (in relation to claims of liability for risk-creating conduct)
are corollaries of the principle that liability in tort is based
generally on fault. They are concerned with a quality of plaintiff's participation in causing harm to himself - a quality that,
if not weighing more heavily against liability than defendant's
fault weighs in support of liability, may at least bring the competition of factors into equilibrium and invoke the fundamental
74. Professor Mansfield's illuminating analysis of the philosophical basis for
recognizing informed choice as a defense (Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of
Torts, supra p. 17 et seq.) is, it seems to me, focused primarily on those tort cases
in which the plaintiff's manifestations of consent have been communicated to the
defendant prior to the occurrence of the conduct on account of which the defendant
is charged with negligence.. That focus is conducive to the view that there is a
common philosophical basis for effectiveness of consent in contract and in tort.
Near the conclusion of his article, (at pp. 57-73) Professor Mansfield raises the
possibility that there may be different considerations operating in those assumption of risk cases in which plaintiff's manifestations of consent do not come to
defendant's attention until harm has occurred. It seems to me not only that this
is true but also that some considerations different from those underlying the effect
of consent in contract bear upon consent or assumption or risk in the tort cases
on which Professor Mansfield focuses primary attention. The discussion that follows, in the present article, is an effort to consider what, if any, distinctive bases
can be found for a tort rule that gives effect to informed choice where contract law
does not. Perhaps my urge to seek such a basis is influenced by a belief that the
philosophical justifications for giving effect to informed choice grow progressively
weaker in a succession from the most to the least consensual form of assumption
of risk.
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premise that loss shall not be shifted unless the shifting will
accomplish more good than harm.
The relationship between consent and plaintiff's blameworthiness with respect to his own injury is much like that
between intentional interference and defendant's blameworthiness. We are accustomed to thinking of doctrines of intentional
tort as based in general, though with some particular exceptions, upon blameworthiness, and indeed blameworthiness of a
greater degree than that on which, in general and again with
exceptions, the law of negligence is based. But many intentional
interferences with the interests of others are neither tortious
nor blameworthy. A determination of the blameworthy quality
of an intentional interference must depend, therefore, not alone
upon the fact that the interference is intentional, but also upon
appraisal of reasons for the interference, which happen to be
dealt with under doctrines of privilege. Is it not true, similarly,
that an assessment of blame or lack of it in plaintiff's consenting to an intentional interference or in consenting to a risk,
by making an informed choice to encounter it, is dependent not
alone upon the fact of consent but also upon appraisal of plaintiff's reasons for consenting?
In relation to negligence claims, the traditional doctrinal
apparatus provides for a single-step weighing of all the diverse
qualities of the actor's conduct to determine whether it shall
be characterized as negligence. This method is in contrast with
that by which we recognize the prima facie showing of intentional interference and then look to factors of justification
under the rubric of privilege. The latter method of two-step
analysis is also the traditional method of considering the defense
of consent in relation to intentional torts. Thus, there is a substantial body of doctrine concerning expressions of consent that
are ineffectual as defenses because of duress or incapacity. But
this two-step method of analysis has not been employed customarily in cases concerned with assumption of risk. The want
of any established understanding that factors of justification
will be considered, either in determining whether conduct shall
be characterized as an assumption of risk or as a separate step
of inquiry comparable to that concerning privilege in relation
to intentional torts, has been a source of confusion. It has sometimes led to the assumption that factors of justification are
irrelevant and that assumption of risk (as distinguished from
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the contributory negligence that overlaps with it) is in no way
concerned with blameworthiness. But there is implicit recognition of the significance of justifying factors in holdings that
the doctrine of assumption of risk is inapplicable to a choice to
encounter a risk under circumstances that might fairly be characterized as a form of duress.15 In the absence of such justifying
factors, the plaintiff's uncoerced and informed choice to encounter a risk is, from the point of view of determining whether
he along with others should be blamed for bringing about his
own injury, very much like defendant's choice to interfere in
plaintiff's affairs without justification. This conclusion is fortified by the element of co-authorship discussed in the next paragraph below. The independence of this notion of blame from
that involved in contributory negligence is fortified by the distinction between causing risk to oneself and causing risk to
others, discussed in the next section below.
Perhaps it would be unfair to characterize the harm suffered by a plaintiff in a consent case as "self-inflicted," but if,
without duress, the person whose interests are affected invites
an interference by manifesting consent to it, he is at least a
co-author of his own harm. Similarly, the plaintiff who, without
duress, chooses to encounter a risk is, along with the defendant
who created it, co-author of harm to himself within that risk.
In this situation, in counterweight to the utility of the tort
cause of action as a deterrent to conduct like the defendant's
is the disutility of its encouragement of conduct like the plaintiff's. In counterweight to the utility of compensating for plaintiff's loss is the disutility of imposing a like loss on the defendant. Thus we are driven toward application of the basic
premise of tort law that the legal system ought to leave a loss
where it lies unless more good than harm will be accomplished
by shifting it. Moreover, it may happen that there is not merely
a dead balance of factors favoring and disfavoring liability, but
rather a heavier weighting against liability. A teacher of first
year law students has the opportunity to observe anew each year
a widely manifested, deep-seated reaction that some applications
of assumption of risk are entirely just -a
reaction that, being
inadequately explained on the basis of an equilibrium of factors
for and against shifting the loss, suggests instead a notion that
it is unfair for one to be allowed a recovery from another despite
75. Duress is discussed at pp. 154-159 infra.
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free and informed co-authorship of his own harm, though the
justification and limits of this notion may prove most elusive
when articulation is demanded.
Perhaps the explanation for this common reaction lies primarily in the fact that it is associated with the view, still widely
held despite vigorous attacks against it, that fault is the most
acceptable basis for liability in tort.
The defense of contributory fault may not be a good answer
to the argument for liability, however, if there are material
differences in the character of plaintiff's and defendant's participation in the events leading up to the loss. One illustration
of this point is that contributory negligence is ordinarily not a
defense to a claim of intentional tort. Another illustration is
that where the basis of liability is changed from negligence to
the principle of workmen's compensation - where the basis of
liability is no longer the creation of an unreasonable risk in
relation to the particular case - contributory negligence and
assumption of risk may cease to be good answers to claims
based on new and different reasons for shifting loss. It may be,
for like reason, that whenever the basis of products liability is
strict rather than negligence, assumption of risk should be inapplicable. The conclusion reached on this point in relation to
a particular line of cases is appropriately dependent on the basis
for imposing strict liability in those cases.
If capacity to bear and distribute risk were substituted for
fault as the basis of liability in tort law, assumption of risk
would lose nearly all its power to command a following. If
liability were to be imposed upon each enterprise for harms
typical of the enterprise,7 6 without proof of fault, probably
assumption of risk would lose its force as an independent theory
of defense, though the plaintiff's free and informed choice to
encounter a risk would be a relevant factor bearing on the question whether the risk was typical of the defendant's enterprise
rather than being typical of the plaintiff's activity. To the extent that negligence continues to be the basis of liability, however, the doctrine of assumption of risk continues to commend
itself if (a) it is limited to cases in which either objectively
consensual assumption of risk or an even more consensual form
can be proved and (b) it is duly qualified to exclude cases of
76. A proposal of this type is presented in EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT

FAULT (1951).
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duress, as that concept is developed below. Both of these qualifications are supported by the analogy to the doctrine of consent
in intentional torts.
Arguably extension of the doctrine to cases in which the
risk was obvious is supportable on the theory that it is the most
practical method of giving effect to the policy justifications
for recognition of the defense of consent to risk. Since courts
and juries are less likely to brand the plaintiff a liar than to
find that the risk he says he did not appreciate was nevertheless
obvious, it may happen that, from an overall point of view, case
results will be more consistent with the policy justifications
underlying recognition of the defense of consent to risk than if
findings of such consent were required even where the risk was
obvious. If this extension of the doctrine beyond consent to
risk is allowed, however, the standard for "obvious" should be
very much more restrictive than a standard concerned with what
should have been appreciated by an ordinarily prudent person
in plaintiff's position. Use of the latter standard for defining
"obvious" would extend the practical impact of assumption of
risk well beyond the concept of consent to risk.
Assumption of risk by consent to conduct or condition, associational assumption of risk, and imposed assumption of risk
are to increasing extents beyond the analogy to consent; comments in justification of the defenses of consent in intentional
torts and its analogue in negligence law are inapplicable to these
less consensual concepts of assumption of risk. For this reason,
it would be well that courts and writers refrain from using
assumption of risk in these senses, and that liability in such
cases be denied only if there are independent grounds for imposing this consequence even despite the lack of plaintiff's consent to the risk. In most other instances within the broader
usage of assumption of risk no independent grounds of satisfactory quality could be found. But if they could be found in
exceptional cases, it would contribute to clarity of analysis and
expression if those cases, not concerned with consent to risk,
were dealt with under another rationale, such as duty or cause,
rather than assumption of risk.
C.

Risk to Oneself versus Risk to Others

It might be suggested that policy considerations concerned
with coauthorship of harm to oneself serve to support a de-
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fense only if the quality of the plaintiff's conduct, including his
free and informed choice, goes beyond the limits of reasonableness - that is, that they support the denial of relief only if the
plaintiff's choice is a contributorily negligent one. But there is
a difference between causing risk to oneself and causing risk
to others. Consider, for example, the objective of amusement.
It deserves attention in the weighing of utility against risk to
determine whether conduct is unreasonably risky.7 7 Weighing
the actor's interest in amusement against risk to others is quite
a different matter from weighing the actor's interest in amusement against risk to himself. It may be reasonable to have fun
at one's own expense or risk, when not so at the expense or risk
of others. Thus the concept of contributory negligence, concerned with unreasonableness in relation to the conduct, rather
than unreasonableness in relation to the expectation that another
will foot the bill, is too narrow to serve fully the policy justifications for denying relief to one who is co-author of his own harm
by consenting to the risk out of which it arises.
It is not clear that jurors, even if following instructions,
are precluded from applying a definition of contributory negligence that is a judgment only that it is unreasonable for plaintiff to engage in this course of conduct and then recover full
compensation from another for the harm suffered, as distinguished from a judgment that his conduct falls below the standard of ordinary prudence for self-protection, irrespective of
potential compensation for harm. It is clear, however, that such
a definition of contributory negligence would differ from the
dafinition of primary negligence in much the same way that
tae concept of "conditional fault" differs from "fault,"7 8 and
1hat no such definition of contributory negligence is expressed
in current jury instructions or in the doctrines currently used
in determining whether a case should be taken from the jury
because contributory negligence is established as a matter of
law.
D.

The Duress of Defendant's Wrong

Policy justifications for recognition of the defense of consent
to risk are dependent upon plaintiff's having a free choice. That
77. Cf. Kimbar v. Estis, 1 N.Y.2d 399, 405, 135 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1956): "To
hold summer camps to a duty of floodlighting woods . . . would be unfair . . . to
the youth who seek the adventure of living closer to nature. .. "
78. See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REv. 401

(1959).
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is not the case if the defendant's breach of duty so restricts
plaintiff's range of choice that he is under pressure to elect to
encounter the risk that defendant has caused. In such circumstances, the defendant's breach of duty operates as a form of
duress.
Though not customarily referred to as duress, this concept
has been evolving in common law decisions from a date that is
very early in relation to the emergence of negligence as a distinct theory of action. Clayards v. Dethick79 was an action on
the case for causing the death of a horse owned by the plaintiff,
a cab proprietor. The evidence was that defendants, in constructing a drain pursuant to authorization, made an unfenced
excavation that obstructed the narrow passageway through
which the mews on which plaintiff's stables were located communicated with a street. As plaintiff was leading a horse over
the mound of dirt piled beside the excavation, the mound gave
way. The horse fell in and was strangled while an attempt was
being made to get it out. A verdict for plaintiff was upheld
against an attack on that part of the jury charge stating that
"it could not be the plaintiff's duty to refrain altogether from
coming out of the mews merely because the defendants had made
the passage in some degree dangerous."80
Harper and James identify seven categories of cases in which
applicability of the doctrine of assumption of risk has commonly
been denied; they concern travelers on the highway, tenants
(and others in their right) using common areas under the landlord's control, patrons of public utilities using areas or equipment appropriate for use to secure services of the utility, landowners whose access has been obstructed (as in Claycrds v.
Dethick), persons injured while at a place where they have a
right to be without regard to defendant's consent, persons
moving to a nuisance or using their own land in a way that
increases the hazard caused by defendant's wrong, and persons
engaged in attempted rescues."'
The temptation is great, because of the simplicity and clarity
of the rule that might be achieved, to accept as an explanation
of all these types of cases the generalization that assumption
79. 12 Q.B. 439, 116 Eng. Rep. 932 (1848).
80. Id. at 442, 116 Eng. Rep. at 933. It is of interest, perhaps, that the
phrase "assumption of risk" does not appear in the report of the arguments and
opinions in this case.
81. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1165-67 (1956).
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of risk is inapplicable wherever it appears that defendant's
breach of duty was a cause of plaintiff's harm. 2 That would
mean, of course, that consent to risk is not an independent basis
for defense in any situation, though it might be one among other
factors bearing on defendant's duty and plaintiff's contributory
negligence. If this much is accepted, it would seem to follow
that the whole development of the doctrine of assumption of
risk has been worse than useless, adding exactly nothing that
properly affects results and much that causes confusion because
of common belief that the doctrine is meant to affect results.
Put aside, for the moment, the choice of terminology- the
question whether, if consent to risk is to be recognized as an
independent basis for denial of liability, it is to be classified
as an affirmative defense of assumption of risk or instead as
a distinct phase of the duty concept, in which phase duty would
be recognized but for consent to risk. The generalization suggested above is not merely a statement of preference for the
latter over the former system of terminology, but rather an
assertion that consent to risk shall not be an independent basis
for denial of liability under any terminology. This sweeping
assertion is contrary to precedent. It is also contrary to the
principle that co-authorship of harm by free and informed consent to risk is relevant to liability; in some circumstances, the defendant's substandard conduct does not cause the plaintiff's
choice to be made under duress rather than freely.
One way in which the defendant's substandard conduct may
cause a risk of harm to the plaintiff without placing the plaintiff under duress to encounter it is that it may add to plaintiff's
range of choice rather than restricting it. If this were the only
way, then it would seem an appropriate generalization that the
doctrine of assumption of risk should be inapplicable whenever
defendant's breach of duty restricts the range of choice that
the plaintiff would have enjoyed if defendant had not acted;
no other qualification concerning duress would be needed. It
happens that in most instances conduct of a defendant that is
82. Harper and James offer this generalization with respect to assumption of
risk in their primary sense, which is comparable to the concept identified in this
article as associational assumption of risk. Id. at 1165. They also say that assumption of risk in their secondary sense (when plaintiff deliberately chooses to
encounter the risk) bars plaintiff only if he was contributorily negligent. Id. at
1162. Thus it appears that they would accept the generalization in the text above
if "assumption of risk" is taken to mean anything distinct from a form of contributory negligence.
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unduly risky also restricts plaintiff's range of choice. Thus,
under this generalization, the area in which the doctrine of
assumption of risk would apply would be quite limited. In any
event, the area in which this doctrine produces a different legal
result rather than an added reason for the same result is limited
by the fact that often in circumstances where a judge or jury
would make fact findings of consent to risk they would also
make fact findings that the defendant's conduct was not unreasonable or the judge would also reach the legal conclusion,
irrespective of plaintiff's appreciation of the risk and choice to
encounter it, that the defendant had no legal duty to the plaintiff. With all these limitations of the practical effect of the
doctrine, its range of effectivenes might seem too narrow to
justify the price of maintaining an independent doctrine. But
it seems likely that a choice to encounter risk should be regarded
as free of duress in a somewhat larger area of cases than merely
those in which plaintiff's range of choice is in no way restricted
by defendant's substandard conduct. The generalization offered
in the Restatement of Torts supports this suggestion, since by
its terms the plaintiff, in order to avoid application of the doctrine, must show that defendant's substandard conduct "has
undergo
created a situation in which it is reasonably necessary 8to
' 3
a risk in order to protect a right or avert a harm.
The scope of duress in other areas of law does not extend to
all pressures, however minor in character or degree. While the
scope of the concept in relation to assumption of risk probably
should be broader than it is in relation to some other areas of
law, it seems reasonable to require something more substantial
than a mere showing that in some way the defendant's conduct
has restricted plaintiff's range of choice.
Consider a hypothetical case in which the plaintiffs Black
and Blue are persons to whom the purchaser of a defectively
designed motorcycle lends it, after discovering the defect and
with full warning to Black but not to Blue, the plaintiffs having
need of a vehicle and reasonably choosing to take this, the only
vehicle available. If, as would surely be possible in some courts,
both plaintiffs could overcome any arguments that the defendant manufacturer's duty was one of warning only and, in any
event, that its unreasonably risky design was not a legal cause
of the harm suffered by plaintiffs,8 4 Blue, who did not know
83. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 893 (1934).

84. E.g., compare Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d
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of the defect, would recover. As in the case of Blue, Black was
not contributorily negligent, but, having known of the defect
and having fully appreciated the danger, he consented to the
risk. It might be argued that his range of choice was restricted
by defendant's substandard conduct, because the purchaser of
the motorcycle probably would have had another and safer vehicle to lend to plaintiffs if the defendant had not marketed
motorcycles of defective design, including the one that figured
in the accident. But it is probably more realistic to ascribe the
compulsion under which the plaintiff Black made his choice to
other factors (e.g., an emergency need for medical attention to
Blue) than to duress from defendant's substandard conduct. The
rationale of Saeter,58 recognizing assumption of risk as one of
two independent grounds of judgment, suggests the result of
nonliability to Black in the hypothetical case.8 6 Arguably no
different result would be reached under the Restatement rule
concerning duress, under which assumption of risk is inapplicable if the defendant "has created a situation in which it is
reasonably necessary to undergo a risk in order to protect a
right or avert a harm. '1 7 (Emphasis added.) Does the defendant "create" the situation by contributing one factor to it? Does
not the answer depend on the relative significance of that factor
among others?
Perhaps the combination of the suggested legal results in
the hypothetical cases of Black and Blue seems to reward
ignorance and penalize appreciation of risk. But this is a paradox similar to one that is a familiar part of the law of contributory negligence. The person who knows more about the
dangers of some object than that minimum for which all members of the community are held legally responsible is judged
627 (1959) (issue concerning causal relation between manufacturer's negligence
and injury to dealer's mechanic was for the jury where notice concerning defective
brakes of a particular model had been given to dealer, and dealer's assistant service manager knew of the defect in individual car before forgetfully driving it and
striking mechanic) with Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d
840, 842 (1946) (judgment for defendant manufacturer, the issue of causal relation between manufacturer's negligence and injury to subvendee's guest-driver
being taken from the jury, where safety latch to supplement defective hood latch
had been given to dealer and by dealer tendered to but rejected by original retail
vendee, who was dealer's salesman).

Also see GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN

THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 168-70 (1960), and cases cited in notes 69 and 70
8upra.
85. See text at note 49 supra.
86. By deliberate choice, the hypothetical facts do not involve a sale of the
motorcycle to Black "as is." Of course the argument for nonliability would be
somewhat stronger if such a sale were assumed.
87. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 893 (1934).
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by the standard of an ordinarily prudent person with his exceptional knowledge, thus seemingly being held to a more demanding standard than that applied to his less learned contemporaries. The answer to this paradox, in both instances, is that
the quality of the conduct of one who acts with the benefit of
the greater knowledge is different from that of one who acts
without it. Here, the difference is that between consent to risk
and nonconsent. If one finds this answer unpersuasive, he will
be driven hard toward the conclusion that there is too little of
merit in the doctrine of assumption of risk to justify its retention as an independent basis for denial of liability.
E.

Proration of Loss or Denial of Relief

Should proration of loss rather than complete denial of recovery be the rule applicable in the event of co-authorship of
harm to oneself? If it is a sound view that the doctrine of
consensual assumption of risk is based on blameworthy participation by plaintiff, this problem is analogous to that concerning the effect of contributory negligence. So long as contributory negligence is given the effect of a complete bar, probably the same effect should be given to consensual assumption
of risk. But a rule of comparative negligence seems fairer than
the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar, and
there are indications that comparative negligence will be adopted
in more jurisdictions in the future. The principal argument for
sharing of the loss in that situation is based on the notion that
it is unfair that the whole loss be placed on either of two parties, both of whom have contributed to causing it by conduct
infringing a legal standard - the standard of reasonable care.
While the nature of the standard is different in assumption of
risk cases, the element of co-authorship remains. Moreover, the
differences in nature of plaintiff's contribution and defendant's
contribution may not be so great as the different characterizations of negligence and assumption of risk seem to suggest.
Whatever those differences may be, they leave unaffected the
basic notion of comparative negligence that neither of the coauthors of harm should have to bear it all. Undoubtedly it would
be more difficult to apply to assumption of risk a rule of proration according to relative degrees of fault, as is done in some
forms of comparative negligence. But if the problems of administration make such a rule of proration seem inappropriate,
as may be the case, should not a rule of equal sharing among
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co-authors of the harm, like that applicable to contribution

among tortfeasors, be preferred over a rule that assumption of
risk is a complete bar?
A finding of assumption of risk has been regarded as a
complete bar to a claim based on negligence, even under a comparative negligence statute.8 8 But in one of the comparative
negligence states, Wisconsin, there have been recent indications
of the probability of a full-scale re-examination of the doctrine
of assumption of risk, 89 and such a re-examination might well
include the question whether, if any form of assumption of risk

is to be preserved, it should be treated as a partial rather than
complete defense to achieve consistency in principle with comparative negligence. It would be well, also, that this problem
be dealt with explicitly in comparative negligence statutes that
are adopted or amended in the future.90
IV.

COMMENTS ON TERMINOLOGY

In cases of consent to risk, it is possible to express the conclusion of nonliability, as most commentators prefer to do,9 ' by
saying that the defendant has no duty to one who fully appreciates the risk and chooses to encounter it, or to one who

objectively manifests such appreciation and choice.

But we

might as readily say that the defendant has no duty to one who
is contributorily negligent.9 2 In both instances, the result of
88. E.g., Krolikowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1960), applying Wisconsin law.
89. Concurring opinion of Broadfoot, J., joined by Martin, C.J., and Brown,
J., in Baird v. Cornelius, 12 Wis.2d 284, 107 N.W.2d 278, 288 (1961).
90. While comparative negligence statutes generally have contained no explicit
reference to assumption of risk, the F.E.L.A. abolishes the defense in cases to
which it is applicable. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as amended by 53 Stat. 1404 (1939),
45 U.S.C. § 54 (1952).
91. E.g., Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 16-18
(1906), reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 441, 443-46 (1926) ;
2 HARPER AND JAMEs, TORTS 1162 (1956). The reader will also find that other
contributors to this symposium use versions of the no-duty interpretation of
assumption of risk.
92. During the early development of the defense of contributory negligence, it
was occasionally explained on the somewhat analogous basis that defendant's conduct was not a legal cause of plaintiff's harm, his own fault being the entire cause.
E.g., Bayley, J., in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 60, 61 (K.B. 1809) ("If he
had used ordinary care he must have seen the obstruction; so that the accident
appeared to happen entirely from his own fault") ; Bowen, L.J., in Thomas v.
Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 697 (1887) (contributory negligence rests on the
view that "the plaintiff has by his own carelessness severed the causal connection
between the defendant's negligence and the accident"). Perhaps it is significant
that the latter opinion is also a leading exposition of the no-duty interpretation of
assumption of risk. See Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARv. L. REV.
14, 16-18 (1906), reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 441, 44344 (1926), criticizing the "confusion" of contributory negligence and legal cause
in this opinion, but applauding the assimilation of assumption of risk and no duty.
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denial of relief would thus be expressed in terms connoting the
lack of some requisite concerned with either the quality of defendant's conduct or the nature of the relation between plaintiff
and defendant, for this surely is the connotation of "no duty."
But in both instances the basis for refusal of relief is a quality
of plaintiff's participation in bringing about the harm.
Consider the hypothetical case of the use of a defectively
designed motorcycle by two persons, only one of whom is aware
of the defect.9 3 The manufacturer's conduct plainly violates a
duty of care toward the one who is not aware of the defect. The
distinction between this claimant and the other, who probably
cannot recover, turns solely on the fact that only the latter fully
appreciated the risk. If nonliability to the latter is explained
by saying that the manufacturer had no duty to him, then the
concept of duty, connoting something concerning defendant's
participation in bringing about plaintiff's harm or concerning
the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, is so
defined as to turn instead on a characteristic of plaintiff's participation. The statement that defendant had "no duty" in these
circumstances is at least misleading in connotation. On the
other hand, the statement that the plaintiff is barred by "assumption of risk" connotes, and correctly so in this instance,
that the decision against liability is based upon the plaintiff's
consent to risk.
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 94 presents a good
example of the quality of the terminology under which it is
insisted that a defense based on the plaintiff's voluntary but
reasonable choice to encounter risk be classified as a no-duty
defense; it well illustrates the likelihood that this terminology
will produce ambiguity at least and perhaps outright confusion
as well. This opinion is not an extraordinarily vulnerable statement of the point of view under criticism; rather it states that
view very well indeed. One of the points of the opinion- a
point also expounded by Harper and James95 - is that assumption of risk in one sense (called "primary") is merely the converse of the proposition that there was no breach of duty by
defendant, and in another sense (called "secondary") is merely
a form of contributory negligence because, in the latter sense,
it is not an effective defense unless plaintiff's voluntary sub93. See text at note 84 8upra.
94. 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
95. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1162 (1956).
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mission to the known risk was unreasonable. Near the end of
the Meistrich opinion, the following passage appears:
"The fact that there [in cases in which the defendant
has a duty to warn of the existence of a risk that is not
itself the product of the defendant's negligence] plaintiff's
knowledge of the risk is crucially involved in the issue of
defendant's breach of duty should not obscure the obligation of the plaintiff to prove that breach, i.e., a failure to
warn. Different, of course is a case in which the risk itself
was negligently created and defendant as part of his affirmative defense of contributory negligence seeks to prove that
plaintiff was warned or knew of it." 96 (Emphasis added.)
In context, this passage implies that if the defendant negligently created the risk, his only available defense of assumption of risk is one in the "second" sense, a type of contributory
negligence. This implied proposition is accurate only if the word
"negligently," at the points italicized above, is taken to mean
not merely "carelessly" or "unreasonably" but also "and in
breach of a legally recognized duty." Proponents of this terminology concede that the defendant who has created a danger
under circumstances such that he would be held negligent toward
a person ignorant of the danger is sometimes held not subject
to liability to one who is fully aware of the danger. If one
chooses, as a matter of terminology, to say that such a defendant's single course of conduct in creating a dangerous condition
today is negligent toward those victims of future days who are
ignorant of the danger but is not negligent toward those victims
of future days who become fully aware of the danger before
they suffer injury from it, then the proposition implied in the
foregoing passage is accurate. But the form of statement is
misleading in that it might cause the reader to believe that the
plaintiff's full appreciation of the risk was being declared wholly
irrelevant to liability unless his conduct amounted to contributory negligence. On the other hand, if in the foregoing quotation
and in the implied proposition the word "negligently" is taken
as a description of the unreasonable quality of defendant's conduct described as of a time when he could foresee that some
potential victims would discover the dangerous condition and
others would not, then the implied proposition is inaccurate since
liability may be defeated on a no-duty theory (assumption of
96. 31 N.J. at 56, 155 A.2d at 97.
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risk in the "primary" sense) by proof that the plaintiff fully
appreciated the danger and voluntarily encountered it.
Another statement often made by proponents of the terminology under criticism is that assumption of risk negates the
existence of any duty on defendant's part. Of course consent to
risk bears on the quality of defendant's conduct if the consent
is communicated to defendant prior to the occurrence of his
conduct. If the proposition that assumption of risk negates duty
is limited to this situation, it is unobjectionable. If the proposition is extended to cases in which consent to risk occurs at a
time well after defendant's conduct, however, it applies to cases
in which defendant, at the time of his conduct, did not know
that consent to the risk would occur and in that state of uncertainty was unreasonable in creating the risk. The quality of
defendant's conduct is not changed by the plaintiff's subsequent
consent to risk. Rather, the explanation of nonliability is in
the quality of plaintiff's participation in bringing about his own
injury.
It is relevant to the choice of terminology that wherever
plaintiff's awareness of the danger is in factual dispute, this
97
issue must be submitted to the jury with guiding instructions.
Adoption of the point of view under criticism, if consistently
adhered to, would lead to instructing the jury that whether defendant violated his duty of reasonable care for the protection
of the plaintiff depends not alone on the question whether defendant acted reasonably but also on the question whether plaintiff became aware of the danger created by defendant. This is
true since the jury must find the defendant not negligent if they
find either (a) that the defendant acted reasonably or, (b) that
even though the defendant may have acted unreasonably, the
plaintiff was fully aware of the danger and voluntarily encountered it.
If assumption of risk is incorporated into the concept of no
duty, the effect is to treat it as "an exceptional curtailment of
97. Classifying the problem as one of duty rather than assumption of risk
should not preclude the jury's participation in resolving factual disputes. It is
sometimes loosely stated that a question of duty is always one for the court, but
this assertion is not well founded if it is meant to apply to a determination of
the disputed facts of a particular case. Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928), wherein Cardozo, C.J., speaking of
a factual dispute relevant to duty under his analysis, stated: "The range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court, and at times, if varying
inferences are possible, a question for the jury."
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defendant's duty"9 8 that not only is a diversion from the main
theme of the concept of duty but also is in all instances dependent on plaintiff's conduct and in some instances on plaintiff's
subsequent conduct. Confusion is less likely, both on the bench
and in the jury room, if consent to risk is treated instead as a
distinct, affirmative defense, concerned with plaintiff's own participation in bringing about the harm of which he is complaining.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

If an independent doctrine of assumption of risk is to be
maintained, it should be limited to cases that fall strictly within
the concept of consent to risk or within that slight deviation
from this concept concerning risks that are obvious. Within this
limited scope, the doctrine is supported by policy factors concerned with plaintiff's co-authorship of his own harm -policy
factors that are inapplicable to less consensual forms of assumption of risk, including assumption of risk by consent to conduct
or condition, associational assumption of risk, and imposed assumption of risk. If application of the doctrine in any of these
last three forms has policy support, it is on grounds other than
co-authorship by consent to risk. Both incisiveness of inquiry
into the adequacy of asserted grounds for denial of liability and
clarity of expression of decisions and reasons would be facilitated if use of the phrase "assumption of risk" in these essentially nonconsensual senses were discontinued. Those decisions
of nonliability of a manufacturer that are reached on the theory
that his duty is rigidly limited to warning conform with this
recommendation about choice of terminology and in so doing
expose to clearer view their own susceptibility to criticism on
substantive grounds. 9
It may be suggested that the dispute concerning applicability
of a separate doctrine, assumption of risk, to cases of free and
informed consent to risk is principally one of terminology. It
seems likely, however, that the dispute runs deeper and that
critics of this usage of assumption of risk, not accepting the
policy justifications outlined above, would prefer that the defense not be recognized under any name in circumstances where
none of the other theories of defense is appropriate. If that
98. The quoted phrase is from 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1191 (1956).

99. See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), taking
note of susceptibility of the result to criticism but responding that a change "so
fundamental" is a function of the legislature rather than the courts.
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be so, perhaps their objective is more likely to be achieved if
the problem of consent to risk is dealt with as one of duty, since
the blameworthy character of defendant's conduct is more likely
to seem an adequate answer to an argument of no duty than to
one of affirmative defense. 1°0
The question whether consent to risk is to be recognized as a
basis of denial of liability is a matter of greater concern than
the question whether the doctrine is to be regarded as an aspect
of the duty of the defendant or instead as a distinct defense.
Undoubtedly the plaintiff's consent to risk, if communicated to
the defendant, is relevant to appraisal of the quality of defendant's participation and the nature of the relationship between
plaintiff and defendant, and thus to the question of duty. Is
consent to risk also independently relevant as a kind of contributory fault other than contributory negligence - as coauthorship of harm to oneself?
In the vast majority of cases in which the element of coauthorship of harm by consent to risk furnishes a justification
for denial of liability, it happens that there is also justification
for that result either on grounds of "no duty" in the stricter
sense, consistent with the connotations of that phrase, or on
other grounds such as want of a showing that defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of plaintiff's harm. Thus
it is a debatable question whether recognition of an independent
doctrine of consensual assumption of risk (or a comparable
limitation as a distinct phase of the duty concept) will affect
the results in enough cases to warrant the costs of maintaining
such a doctrine in tort law. It might be argued that a degree of
continuing confusion about the outer limits of the doctrine is
inevitable if we attempt to maintain it, and that this confusion
may lead to more results that are unsatisfactory from the point
of view of ideal adherence to policy justifications underlying
tort law than would occur if the independent doctrine were
abolished.
100. Of. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1191 (1956): "[W]herever assumption
of risk, in the primary sense, applies, this means that there is an exceptional curtailment of defendant's duty below the generally prevailing one to take care to
conduct oneself so as not to cause unreasonable danger to others ....
[T]hese exceptions represent a doubtful policy indeed and are back eddies in the rising tide
of liability at least for the injurious consequences of unreasonably dangerous acts
and omissions, i.e., of negligence. And if such a result is thought desirable perhaps
it is more likely to be reached here through the back door of assumption of risk which makes a lack of duty look like a defense- than through a more straightforward analysis."
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But a more optimistic view of the capacity of our legal system to approach the ideal seems appealing. A wisely pruned
doctrine of assumption of risk, analogous to the doctrine of

consent in actions based on intentional interferences, seems
worth preserving as a defense to actions based on negligence.
Such a doctrine, adhering closely to the concept of consent to
risk, will properly affect results occasionally. Moreover, there
is some value, perhaps, in the expression of a principle as closely
tied to our way of thought about the basis of liability in negligence as this one appears to be, even when it is a second reason
for the same result that would otherwise be reached.
Policy justifications for recognizing defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk are plainly less cogent, however, in relation to claims based on strict liability. Though the
issue is debatable, it appears that the better solution is to deny
recognition of an independent defense of consent to risk in cases
of strict liability for injuries resulting from defective products.101 If this view prevails, the significance of assumption of
risk in products liability cases will diminish with the trend
toward strict liability.
101. This is not to deny, however, the relevance of plaintiff's free choice to
encounter a known danger as a factor bearing on the question whether the harm
he suffers is within the scope of whatever basis is chosen for the imposition of
strict liability. For example, in a case involving allergic reaction to a cosmetic,
marketed with inadequate warnings, it may be concluded that harm incurred by a
plaintiff who has freely chosen to use the cosmetic, after learning about the risk
from other sources than defendant, is beyond the scope of liability because the defendant's duty, though a strict duty rather than a duty of care, is only a duty of
adequate warning and the failure to discharge that duty is not a legal cause of
harm suffered by one who acquired full notice by other means. The relevance of
plaintiff's free choice to the negation of the prima facie case in such a way as this
is distinct from the question whether an independent defense of consent to risk
should be recognized.
Note that the comment in the text above is concerned with consent to risk. If
"assumption of risk" is used in one of the less consensual senses, no doubt it may
be invoked in relation to strict liability of suppliers of products. For example,
one who uses "assumption of risk" to explain nonliability of a cosmetics manufacturer for allergic reaction to a cosmetic marketed with adequate warning, instead of saying that the manufacturer's duty was merely one of warning and
was fully discharged, might as appropriately invoke this defense in cases of a
strict duty of warning as in those of a duty of care to warn. The same is true
of use of the phrase in relation to cases wherein the risk-creating characteristic
of the product is not regarded as a defect. See an example of such usage in
GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN TIHE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 207 (1960). Unless
the comments of Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consu-mer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1148 (1960), are construed as referring to "assumption of risk" in a sense other than consent to risk, they are in opposition
to the view expressed in the text above since Prosser states, with no indication
of disapproval in principle, that probably the defense of assumption of risk- will'
be carried over to cases of strict liability of suppliers of products.

